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THE APOLOGETICS OF SUPPRESSION: THE 
REGULATION OF PORNOGRAPHY 
AS ACT AND IDEA 
Steven G. Gey* 
Pornography has recently regained prominence as a popular sub-
ject for first amendment analysis. The newfound infamy of pornogra-
phy is the consequence of a revived anti-obscenity crusade, one of a 
long series of such efforts this country has experienced. The latest in-
stallment of the anti-porn effort is distinctive only in the unique com-
position of its proponents; the usual cast of political and religious 
conservatives has been augmented by members of a branch of the fem-
inist movement. The latter group has added to the arsenal of tactical 
weaponry that has been leveled against pornography; the feminist crit-
ics of porn seek to define pornographic expression as a civil rights vio-
lation, and thus remove the suppression of porn from the first 
amendment arena altogether. 
Despite the apparent novelty of the feminist argument, the funda-
mental attributes of the present anti-porn movement reflect its ante-
cedents. The feminist and conservative components of the present 
movement share two basic attitudes toward pornography, both of 
which have also characterized prior efforts to censor sexually explicit 
speech. First, they assert that pornography is socially dysfunctional, 
and for that reason alone is not worthy of rigorous protection under 
the first amendment. This is an aspect of what Joel Feinberg has la-
beled the "principle of moralistic paternalism" often cited to justify 
suppression of lascivious expression.1 Second, the conservative and 
the feminist attacks on pornography each attempt to deny that por-
nography is communication of any sort. They prefer to categorize 
pornography as a sex aid, or as a form of sex discrimination, but dis-
miss the notion that pornographic expression transmits ideas. 
This article reviews - and ultimately rejects - each of these pro-
positions. Both are premised on the notion that some forms of expres-
sion are so beyond the pale that the first amendment does not even 
apply. The first problem with this premise is technical: neither the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A. 1978, Eckerd College; .T.D. 
1982, Columbia University. - Ed. 
1. See, 2 .J. FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 
189 (1985) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS]. 
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conservative nor the feminist strands .of the anti-porn position offers a 
sufficiently objective method by which.to assess when communication 
ceases to be communication. The central premise of the modem cru-
saders (i.e., that pornography is not speech) thus collapses into the 
more familiar debate over the content of particular communication. 
The more significant problem with the pro-suppression position is that 
it cannot be limited to pornographic expression; it provides a broader 
rationale for suppressing deviant expression of many sorts. In effect, 
the judicial opinions and academic theories supporting the suppression 
of pornography endorse a first amendment jurisprudence under which 
the state may certify and enforce a moral code that reinforces and 
justifies the political status quo. A theory of this nature leaves no the-
oretically consistent way to distinguish between offensive or obscene 
speech and the more abrasive, radical political speech that is now pro-
tected under the Brandenburg standard. 2 
The first three parts of this article discuss in detail the relationship 
between the Supreme Court's obscenity rulings and the academic theo-
ries that have been offered to bolster the conclusions reached by the 
Court in this area. Part IV of the article considers a contrary theory 
of free expression that requires constitutional protection for the dis-
semination and possession of pornography. In this section I argue that 
the present efforts to ban pornography are directly linked to a toler-
ance model of free expression. The tolerance model, which is usually 
contrasted with an analytical approach characterized by Holmesian 
skepticism, necessarily relies upon some theory of moral certainty. 
Given the assertion that definitive moral knowledge can be obtained, 
the repressive aspect of the tolerance model becomes clear; speech is 
permitted only to the extent that it serves a positive social function, as 
judged by the moral arbiters lodged in the courts or the legislatures. 
A central premise of this article is that first amendment protections 
should not be based on the tolerance model favored by both traditional 
liberal and contemporary conservative jurisprudence. Rather, the first 
amendment should be recognized as one manifestation of the general 
movement of social thought away from medieval, sectarian theories of 
epistemology, and toward modem theories based on scientific skepti-
cism. In other words, strong protections for free expression are re-
quired by the intellectual framework of the Enlightenment, not from 
some particular political theory that developed in the context of that 
framework. Traditional liberalism fails in its effort to justify the regu-
lation of expression because it has not yet fully abandoned the quest 
2. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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for moral certainty that characterized the prior historical epoch. The 
more avowedly restrictive approaches to pornography (and expression 
generally) fail even more grandly because they propose the impossible 
return to that prior era. 
Having rejected the tolerance model for first amendment jurispru-
dence, the article then attempts to locate pornographic expression 
within the broad category of social deviance generally. Under a 
proper view of the first amendment-that is, one based on the skepti-
cism model-deviance must be protected, not because it is socially 
beneficial, but rather because its suppression requires that someone be 
in a position to assert moral primacy in order to suppress the deviant 
expression. Pornography must be seen not only for what it claims to 
be, but also for what it represents in the way of a basic rejection of the 
moral verities of society generally. It is anarchic and anti-social, but 
for those very reasons is within the range of concerns that should be 
considered worthy of protection by the first amendment. This leads to 
the basic conclusion that the anti-porn forces have fundamentally mis-
construed the nature of pornography, and that only by accepting their 
cropped view of communication and ideas can their repressive goals be 
justified. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MORALITY PRINCIPLE IN 
ANTI-OBSCENITY JURISPRUDENCE 
Concern with the legal suppression of pornographic materials is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. It was not considered an issue of great 
importance by the Framers of the American Constitution, many of 
whom were consumers or producers of bawdy literature.3 It also took 
many years for the problem to merit the attention of the Supreme 
Court, which did not issue its first definitive pronouncement on por-
3. For example, Benjamin Franklin invented the tale of Polly Baker, which told the story of a 
woman prosecuted five times for bearing bastard children. During her fifth trial, the woman 
made an impassioned defense of her sexual adventures by urging the court not to "turn natural 
and useful Actions into Crimes." Franklin, The Speech of Miss Polly Baker, General Advertiser 
(London), Apr. 15, 1747, reprinted in M. HALL, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN & POLLY BAKER app. 
165 (1960). The story was never reprinted in Franklin's own Philadelphia newspaper. One his-
torian has noted that the reasons for Franklin's uncharacteristic restraint in this case are "not 
hard to find." Id. at 85. 
One reason may have been that the influential members of the community, whose friendship 
and approval Franklin needed, frowned upon ribaldry .... Another reason may have been 
religious. Franklin may have withheld Polly from publication because her robust deism and 
the brash enlisting of God's authority against the guardians of law and order would have 
shocked some of his readers and might even have jolted them off his subscription list. 
Id. at 85-86 (footnote omitted). Even in Franklin's day, therefore, sexual expression was viewed 
as implicating the majoritarian ethos writ large. See c. VAN DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 150-
54 (1938), for other examples of Franklin's "surreptitious writings" during the "salty" period of 
Franklin's fortieth year. 
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nography until 1957, in Roth v. United States. 4 The issue did, how-
ever, receive consideration earlier in the state and lower federal courts. 
The cases leading up to Roth established the basic dimensions of the 
principles that still govern the courts' consideration of pornographic 
discourse. This section describes the development of those principles 
in the case law. 
A. The Common Law Background 
Although the first reported American case involving the censor-
ship of pornography occurred in 1815,5 it was not until more than fifty 
years later that a general standard was devised for application in such 
cases. This standard, which would be the basic reference point for 
obscenity prosecutions during approximately the next ninety years, 
was established in a British case decided in 1868.6 The decision in 
Hicklin set the tone for all subsequent efforts to regulate pornographic 
materials. In particular, the case provides a very_ clear statement of 
the morality principle that has served as the touchstone for regulation 
in this area. 7 Although recent decisions have altered somewhat the 
mechanics of applying this principle, the principle itself has been 
retained. 
Hicklin involved the prosecution of an anti-Catholic tract that set 
forth in some detail sexually suggestive questions allegedly asked of 
young women in the confessional. 8 The court determined that 
although the defendant may have been motivated by a legitimate in-
tent to express an opinion concerning ecclesiastical matters, the docu-
ment by which he expressed his opinion nevertheless contained 
numerous "filthy and disgusting and unnatural description[s]" of im-
pure practices, and was therefore "in every sense of the term, an ob-
scene publication. "9 The court held that the offending publica~ion 
could be seized and destroyed, and the defendant could be prosecuted 
under a statute making it a misdemeanor to publish obscene materials. 
The case's enduring significance, however, rests on Lord 
4. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
5. Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa.1815) (obscene drawing). The first 
prosecution ofa book on obscenity grounds was Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). 
See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 468 (1970). The case involved 
John Cleland's novel "Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" (a.k.a. "Fanny Hill"), a book with 
which the American courts would become quite familiar over the next century and a half. See A 
Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs ofa Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 
383 U.S. 413 (1965). 
6. Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868). 
7. See note 14 infra and accompanying text. 
8. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371 (Cockburn, C.J.). 
9. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371. 
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Cockburn's statement of the standard by which obscenity prosecutions 
could be conducted. "[T]he test of obscenity is this, whether the ten-
dency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt 
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into 
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." 10 The task of the 
obscenity law is thus clearly identified: to protect the existing system 
of morality against attacks from within. This point was made even 
more clearly by the arguments of counsel in Hicklin. Defendant's 
counsel relied almost exclusively upon his client's allegedly benign in-
tent. In defending this position, the attorney quoted with approval a 
passage from a contemporary treatise asserting that blasphemy was 
punishable as a crime only if it was intended to "destroy or even to 
weaken man's sense of religious or moral obligations . . . or to bring 
the established religion and form of worship into disgrace and con-
tempt." 11 The prosecuting attorney responded that intent was not 
necessary, but rather that "any publication tending to the destruction 
of the morals of society is punishable by indictment."12 The signifi-
cant thing about this exchange between counsel is their substantial 
agreement upon the proper role of the judiciary. They each concede 
that the judiciary is properly concerned with protecting society's par-
ticular notions of morality. As this proposition was restated by one of 
the judges in Hicklin, "I think it never can be said that in order to 
enforce your views, you may do something contrary to public moral-
ity. "13 Under this scheme, therefore, one may urge "views" only if the 
urging does not contradict "public morality." 
Hicklin thus exemplifies the fundamental component of what I will 
refer to henceforth as the "morality principle": i.e., the notion that 
law is properly concerned with the preservation of a particular struc-
ture of moral beliefs, coupled with the related axiom that reference to 
moral precepts can by itself justify censorship of heretical expression.14 
10. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371. 
11. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 366 (quoting 2 T. STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OP SLANDER AND 
LIBEL 147 (2d ed. 1838). 
12. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 369 (quoting T. STARKIE, supra note 11, at 158). 
13. 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 377 (Blackburn, J.). 
14. The definition of legal moralism offered by Joel Feinberg provides another variation on 
the same theme, cast somewhat more broadly with reference to moral theory instead of constitu-
tional doctrine. Feinberg defines legal moralism as the principle that "[i]t can be morally legiti-
mate to prohibit conduct on the ground that it is inherently immoral, even though it causes 
neither harm nor offense to the actor or others." 1 J. FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OP THE 
CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 27 (1984) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS]. 
Two other conceptual definitions provided by Feinberg are relevant to the subject of this article. 
One is the harm principle, which asserts that the prevention of harm to persons other than the 
actor is "always a good reason in support of penal legislation," if there are no equally effective 
means of prevention at "no greater cost to other values." Id. at 26. The second is the offense 
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The American courts that applied the Hicklin standard in the years 
before the rejection of that standard in Roth 15 understood very well 
the basis for their power to regulate obscenity, and expressed no com-
punctions about their reliance on the morality principle. In the years 
leading up to Roth, the morality principle served very well to justify 
judicial action against scandalous material, and served equally well to 
rebut the notion that literary value could outweigh the harm such ma-
terial posed to the moral fabric. 16 
Furthermore, the morality principle immortalized in the Hicklin 
standard fit easily within the American legal tradition. As Justice 
Brennan pointed out in Roth, anti-pornography statutes in this coun-
try (which did not exist when the Constitution was drafted) were pre-
ceded by blasphemy and profanity statutes in each of the states.17 
Thus, it was natural for the American courts, as it was for the English 
court in Hicklin, to protect not only the metaphysical basis of moral-
ity, but the specific proscriptions of the dominant moral scheme as 
well. Eventually, these specific proscriptions assumed legal signifi-
cance independent of their sectarian origins. This point was driven 
home after the Civil War, when, at the urging of the moral crusader 
Anthony Comstock, the states and federal government began enacting 
in earnest statutes specifically addressing obscenity in a context di-
principle. This principle must be distinguished from simple offensiveness. It is modeled on the 
principles of nuisance law, and asserts that the state may properly regulate offending conduct 
from which there is no convenient escape. See FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note l, at 
1-10. 
In his discussion of Hicklin and subsequent cases, Feinberg contends that the cases are based 
on the principle of moralistic paternalism. Id. at 189. Moralistic paternalism combines the con-
cept of legal moralism with the concept of legal paternalism, which states that "[i]t is always a 
good reason in support of a prohibition that it is probably necessary to prevent harm (physical, 
psychological, or economic) to the actor himself." FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra, at 26-
27. I concur with almost everything Feinberg says in his treatment of the history of judicial 
regulation of pornography, but I prefer to distinguish between judicial justifications based upon 
morality and justifications based upon paternalism, since the latter has special significance with 
regard to the issue of sex discrimination. See notes 199-203 infra and accompanying text. 
15. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). 
16. "Sincerity and literary art are not the antithesis of obscenity, indecency, and impu-
rity. . . . The same book may be characterized by all of these qualities." Commonwealth v. 
lsenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 553, 62 N.E.2d 840, 846 (1945) (upholding obscenity conviction for 
sale of Lillian Smith's novel Strange Fruit). See also Attorney General v. The Book Named 
"God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93 N.E.2d 819 (1950) (upholding obscenity conviction for 
sale "or Erskine Caldwell's novel God's Little Acre, despite book's acknowledged literary merit); 
Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 322, 171 N.E. 472, 474 (1930) (upholding obscenity 
conviction for sale of Theodore Dreiser's novel An American Tragedy "even assuming great liter-
ary excellence, artistic worth and an impelling moral lesson in the story"). 
17. Roth 354 U.S. at 482-83 & n.12. Brennan cites as a representative example the Massa-
chusetts statute passed in 1712, which prohibited the publication of " 'any filthy, obscene, or 
profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon' in imitation or mimicking of religious services." 
354 U.S. at 483. 
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vorced from its theological foundation. 18 
B. The Wa"en Court Era 
In the period leading up to Roth, a few judges had expressed reser-
vations about the repressive consequences of the Hicklin standard,19 
but these reservations were directed more at the mechanics of the stan-
dard rather than at its theoretical base. 20 Even the famous opinion by 
Judge Woolsey, which permitted the distribution and possession of 
James Joyce's Ulysses, rejected only Hicklin's antiquated version of the 
morality principle, not the morality principle itself.21 
Thus, it should have been no surprise when the Supreme Court 
finally applied the principles of the first amendment22 to the matter of 
obscenity, that it would rework the means by which the morality prin-
ciple would be applied in the future, but leave the morality principle 
intact. The Court had, in fact, itself presaged its approach to obscen-
ity several years earlier, when it ruled unanimously that certain kinds 
of expression - such as the lewd and obscene - "are no essential part 
of fil:IY exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality."23 The Court 
had moved away from Hicklin, but not from the central aspect of 
Hicklin,· and in Roth v. United States, 24 the Court for the first time 
certified as constitutional, efforts to enforce a legally defined "social 
interest in order and morality." 
The Roth majority opinion was written by Justice Brennan, who 
would later renounce both Roth and the morality principle on which it 
was based.25 The opinion held what had been asserted in dicta fifteen 
years before: "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
18. See W. KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM: PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 
129-57 (1987). 
19. See, e.g., Judge Learned Hand's grudging application of the Hicklin standard in United 
States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913): "I hope that it is not improper for me to 
say that the rule as laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not 
seem to me to answer to the understanding and morality of the present time •••• " 
20. See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring), ajfd., 
354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
21. See United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),'ajfd. 
sub nom. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
22. Roth v. United States, 354.U.S. 476 (1957). 
23. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (footnote omitted). 
24. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
25. See Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 418 U.S. 939 (1974); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 762-77 (1978) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
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tected speech or press."26 This holding was extremely helpful in af-
firming the convictions in Roth: It relieved the Court from having to 
consider problematic issues, such as the application of the clear and 
present danger test, and the absence of proof as to whether the mate-
rial at issue in those cases had incited anti-social conduct (as opposed 
to merely engendering lascivious thoughts). Even so, Roth is consid-
ered to have been a liberalization of obscenity law, since it limited the 
circumstances in which the morality principle could be applied.27 The 
new considerations Brennan introduced into the process of prosecut-
ing obscenity certainly helped to avoid many of the more obvious 
abuses of the Hicklin standard. But these immediate benefits pale be-
side the mark the opinion made on first amendment theory. 
The opinion firmly established what Harry Kalven later termed 
the "two-level theory" of free expression protection under the first 
amendment: the concept that some forms of expression deserve less 
protection than other, more traditional, forms.28 It was this theoreti-
cal framework that allowed the Court to justify the continued applica-
tion of the morality principle. Under the two-level theory, the state 
could exert heightened control over certain forms of expression that 
did not conform to dominant moral standards. These forms of expres-
sion received diminished protection under the Constitution because of 
their "slight" social value. The two-level theory thus requires that all 
forms of expression be measured against a scale of social values, which 
is, in turn, based on the dominant ethos. Therefore, under the new, 
purportedly liberal standard imposed in Roth, the dominant moral 
scheme was protected from effective repudiation by competing views 
of the ethical universe. The opinion's illiberal core was, however, 
masked by the libertarian patina provided by the Court's explicit hold-
ing that theoretical discussions of morality would still be constitution-
ally protected.29 But the hitch was that such discussions could take 
place only on terms set by those defending the status quo. In order to 
receive constitutional protection, the discussion must be conducted 
26. 354 U.S. at 488-89. 
27. 354 U.S. at 488-89. Brennan rejected the Hicklin standard for determining obscenity 
because it "allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particu-
larly susceptible persons." 354 U.S. at 488-89. In its place, Brennan substituted the standard 
whose basic elements still govern the area: "whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 489 (citations omitted). 
28. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 10. 
29. This point was the basis for the first obscenity opinion issued by the Court after Roth. 
See Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. ofN.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (merely 
advocating immoral conduct, such as adultery, insufficient to justify obscenity prosecution). 
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civilly;30 that is, the conversants must not violate society's version of 
morality by the mode of discussion itself. 
Although the Court has refined the Roth standard in several re-
spects since that opinion was issued, the morality principle has become 
more, not less, prominent in the post-Roth obscenity cases. Refine-
ments were necessary because of the flaccid language Brennan used in 
defining the standard. The Warren Court's subsequent efforts to de-
scribe the standard were equally unavailing.31 Terms such as "current 
community standards," "dominant theme," "prurient interest," and 
"patent offensiveness" mean little in the absence of particular applica-
tions to specific materials. 32 The inability of the Court to define 
clearly the obscenity standard caused some Justices to despair that an 
adequate standard could ever be devised; their solution to this diffi-
culty was simply to give up the task. 33 The frustration felt by the 
Court is reflected in the number of cases decided by the Supreme 
Court without opinion in the decade following Roth. 34 The numerous 
and unpredictable nature of the decisions coming before the Court for 
review led some Justices to conclude that not only should they give up 
trying to provide an exact definition of obscenity, but they should also 
abandon their efforts to police lower-court application of the existing 
vague standard. 3s 
The one thing a majority of the Court did not question in the years 
immediately following Roth was that case's central element: the mo-
rality principle. The last spate of Warren Court obscenity opinions, 
issued on the same day in 1966, indicated the growing strength of that 
principle. 36 The first of these opinions ruled that the infamous book 
30. See, e.g., Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1962) (obscene material must be 
"patently offensive," as determined by reference to "customary limits of candor"). 
31. See, e.g., 370 U.S. at 486 ("patently offensive"); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191-92 
(1964) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (obscene work must be " 'utterly' without social impor-
tance"); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs ofa Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General 
of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (rearranging Roth factors; 
restated constitutional test included three elements: (1) prurient appeal; (2) patent offensiveness; 
and (3) that material be utterly without redeeming social value). 
32. The imprecision of the modem standard mirrors the prior experience under the common 
law. One early American commentator described that experience as follows. "There is no defini· 
tion of the term [obscenity]. There is no basis of identification. There is no unity in describing 
what is obscene literature, or in prosecuting it. There is little more than the ability to smell it." 
Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 (1938). 
33. See Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
34. See Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 15 YALE L.J. 1364, 1373 (1966). 
35. See Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 202-03 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Justice Harlan expressed 
this point of view in Roth, at least with regard to state-law prosecutions. Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. at 500-03. 
36. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General 
of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New 
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
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Fanny Hill was constitutionally protected because it was not "utterly" 
without redeeming social value. 37 More than anything, this opinion 
(which, like the majority opinions in the other two cases issued that 
day, was written by Justice Brennan) reflected the uneasiness of the 
majority about the potential application of the standard to "legiti-
mate" literature. The majority was thus seeking to incorporate into 
the constitutional standard Justice Stewart's previously stated belief 
that obscenity law should apply only to "hard-core" pomography.3s 
But even in the speech-protective context of this case, the majority 
bowed in the direction of the morality principle. As it happened, the 
particular edition of Fanny Hill at issue in Memoirs was presented as a 
stolidly, almost pretentiously, literary work. It was published by a 
mainstream publishing house (G.P. Putnam's Sons of Boston), and 
was endorsed at trial by a bevy of well-credentialed experts. 39 The 
Court warned, however, that a less serious approach toward a work 
such as this might produce a different result. "Evidence that the book 
was commercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal, to the ex-
clusion of all other values, might justify the conclusion that the book 
was utterly without redeeming social importance."40 
The Court reemphasized this point in the second case decided that 
day. In Ginzburg, the Court upheld a five-year prison sentence that 
had been imposed for the mailing of several sexually oriented 
magazines and "handbooks."41 There was evidence that the hand-
books initially had been marketed by their author to members of psy-
chiatric and medical organizations. These individuals were to have 
used the materials in sexual therapy sessions, and they testified that 
they had in fact used them for this purpose.42 Nevertheless, the Court 
found the marketing techniques used by the defendant in selling the 
publications to members of the general public, which emphasized the 
sexual aspects of the material to the exclusion of any other value, vin-
37. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419-20. 
38. See Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). This limitation to "hard-core" 
material has often been cited to suggest that the Court's present obscenity doctrine no longer 
poses any threat to first amendment values. See Schauer, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity and 
"Obscenity'~· An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 61 GEO. L.J. 899, 900 
n.4 (1979). But the "hard-core" test has never been any more successful than the Court's multi-
plicity of other "standards" at separating prohibited material from protected material. Even in 
the opinions issued that day in 1966, Stewart - who originated the "hard-core" emphasis -
disagreed with the majority in two of the three cases as to whether the publications in issue were 
"hard-core" publications. See Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 497 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Mishkin, 383 
U.S. at 518 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
39. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 415 & n.2. 
40. 383 U.S. at 420. 
41. 383 U.S. at 463. 
42. 383 U.S. at 472. 
1574 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1564 
dicated the trial judge's finding that the material predominantly ap-
pealed to the prurient interest. "The 'leer of the sensualist' . . . 
permeates the advertising for the three publications," the Court 
noted, 43 and this salacious "leer" was sufficient in itself to render 
otherwise acceptable material obscene. 
Brennan's opinion articulates an approach that has become com-
monplace in the conservative literature supporting the suppression of 
pornography. The defendant's "pandering" approach to the market-
ing of his publications was deemed unprotected by the first amend-
ment because it sought a reader who "looks for titillation, not . . . 
intellectual content."44 This judicial expression of squeamishness in-
corporates both the morality principle - which asserts that some ex-
pression is so unsavory that it precludes any claim to constitutional 
legitimacy - and the elitism that has permeated obscenity prosecu-
tions from the beginning: what is permissible for those with education 
and training is forbidden to average persons. In Hicklin the Court 
expressed this elitism by focusing on pornography's tendency to "de-
prave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influ-
ences."45 As Joel Feinberg has noted, this portion of the Hicklin 
standard is directly attributable to the attitudes the Victorian elite held 
about the possibly dangerous appetites of the lumpenproletariat, 
whom they feared but did not entirely understand.46 
Brennan purported to abandon such a restrictive standard in Roth 
because the Hicklin standard "might well encompass material legiti-
mately treating with sex."47 But what was allegedly abandoned in 
Roth may have resurfaced in Ginzburg under the "pandering" guise. 
This approach accomplishes exactly what was intended under the sus-
ceptibility component of Hicklin: it permits the suppression of mater-
ial communicating its crude message in an unsubtle manner that 
43. 383 U.S. at 468. 
44. 383 U.S. at 470. See notes 99-148 infra and accompanying text. 
45. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371. 
46. There would appear to be more than a hint of the traditional British patronizing of the 
lower classes in Lord Cockburn's concern for those "into whose hands a publication of this 
sort may fall." Educated gentlemen no doubt can read pornographic books without fear of 
serious corruption, or corruption beyond that which motivates them in the first place, but 
what if the dirty book should just happen to fall into the hands of their servants, and be 
disseminated among ordinary workers and others (not to mention their own wives) who 
may be more susceptible to such influences? 
FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS, supra note 1, at 172. Although Feinberg does not carry his 
analysis of Cockburn's elitism beyond its moral aspects, it is also possible to detect a sublimated 
political fear in the Hicklin opinion. The danger is not just that the proletariat will be morally 
corrupted, but that if it is liberated from the fetters of the rigid moral structure imposed upon it 
from above, it will revolt from encumbrances of a political nature as well. The moral and the 
political considerations cannot be severed. See notes 264-81 infra and accompanying text. 
47. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. 
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makes the elite uncomfortable. As if further notice of this reintroduc-
tion of the susceptibility test were needed, the Court ruled in the third 
case decided along with Ginzburg and Memoirs that the prurient ap-
peal of material "designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly 
defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large" would be 
adjudged according to its appeal to the targeted group, rather than the 
"average" or "normal" person referred to in Roth. 4s 
The Warren Court issued only two other major opinions on por-
nography issues.49 Ginsberg v. New York applied the susceptibility test 
to minors. so In the second case, however, a majority of the Court re-
jected the application of the morality principle in an obscenity case.51 
The defendant in Stanley v. Georgia was successfully prosecuted in the 
lower court for possessing three reels of concededly obscene films. 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction unanimously. Six Justices 
joined in the majority opinion written by Justice Marshall. The state 
defended its action in large part by relying on the morality principle. 
But the Supreme Court would have none of it, rejecting "the assertion 
that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person's 
thoughts. To some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly in-
consistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment."52 On the 
surface this statement of the majority's rationale flies in the face of 
every obscenity case previously decided by the Warren Court. This 
inconsistency can be reconciled only by reference to Marshall's awk-
ward distinction between the state's power to proscribe obscenity and 
the state's power to investigate and prosecute infringements of its ob-
scenity laws. "[T]he States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; 
that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individ-
48. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). Brennan protested strenuously that this 
did not augur a return to the Hicklin standard, because this merely amounted to "adjust[ing] the 
prurient-appeal requirement to social realities" by assessing the appeal of materials in light of the 
particular interests of the "deviant sexual group." 383 U.S. at 508-09. 
However, the operation of this "adjustment'I is indistinguishable from the operation of the 
Hicklin susceptibility test: In both instances the Court approved the identification of a suspect 
group, which was defined in advance by its abnormality. Material appealing to the abnormal 
interests of this group was then to be assessed by a court or jury composed of "normal" people. 
Thus, a group of insiders would be given the task of determining what con8tituted healthy and 
legitimate sexual expression for a group of outsiders. It is highly unlikely that a value-neutral 
assessment of "deviant" sexual material will take place under such a system. 
49. A large batch of per curiam decisions also addressed pornography. See Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 n.3 (1968). 
SO. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Ginsberg upheld a conviction for the sale of two "girlie" 
magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy. The magazines were deemed not obscene for adults, but the 
Court held that New York could appropriately prohibit the distribution of such materials to 
minors. The Court specifically upheld the state's intent to protect the "ethical and moral devel-
opment of our youth." 390 U.S. at 641. 
51. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
52. 394 U.S. at 565-66 (footnote omitted). 
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ual in the privacy of his own home."s3 Because the Court refused to 
own up to the implications of its holding in Stanley, the case can only 
be understood as a privacy decision, rather than the first step in freeing 
the first amendment from the shackles of the morality principle. Stan-
ley did not limit the extent to which the morality principle could be 
employed by the states as justification for legislation restricting sexu-
ally-explicit expression; it merely limited the lengths to which the 
states could go in enforcing such legislation. 
C. The Burger and Rehnquist Court Era 
Thus understood, Stanley was both too little and too late. By 
1969, the morality principle was too well ensconced in first amend-
ment law to be eradicated in a single half-hearted swipe. The task was 
made especially difficult by the advent of the far more conservative 
Burger Court. Given the ammunition provided by the Warren Court, 
the Burger Court would have little trouble limiting Stanley, first pro-
cedurally, s4 then substantively.ss The Warren Court also left a legacy 
of confusing, ad hoc decisionmaking that made the field seem ripe for 
a new approach. s6 
Much is revealed about the nature of the Warren Court standard 
by the fact that the Burger Court did not have to make any major 
theoretical adjustments in order to pursue its more conservative 
agenda. In Miller v. California s7 and Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, ss 
the cases that defined the Burger Court's approach in this area, the 
majority merely reaffirmed the underlying tendencies of the existing 
cases. Following the Warren Court pattern, Chief Justice Burger -
writing in both cases on behalf of the new Burger Court majority -
concentrated on the mechanics of applying the obscenity standard. 
For reasons that are unclear, he viewed the Memoirs decision as 
53. 394 U.S. at 568. 
54. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (seller of pornographic material denied 
standing to raise Stanley issue). 
55. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). The Burger Court was never a strong 
advocate of any aspect of Stanley. Whenever the Court chose to limit the first amendment impli-
cations of that case, it would characterize Stanley as a privacy decision. See Paris Adult Theatre 
Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1973), cert denied, 418 U.S. 939 (1974). Whenever the Court 
chose to limit the privacy implications of Stanley, it would characterize that case as "firmly 
grounded in the first amendment." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 U.S. at 2846. 
56. Beginning with the 1967 decision ofRedrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), the Court 
decided 31 cases by way of per curiam reversals, until the Burger Court took the matter in hand 
in a group of 1973 decisions. See Paris Adult Theatre ], 413 U.S. at 82 n.8 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
57. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
58. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
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"veer[ing] sharply away from the Roth concept."59 Burger therefore 
replaced the three Memoirs factors with three of his own.60 In fact, 
the new Miller standards differed from the Memoirs test only in that 
they introduced a value-balancing test to determine whether a work 
was worthy of first amendment protection. In lieu of the Brennan for-
mulation "utterly without redeeming social value," Burger substituted 
an equation more in keeping with the morality principle: "whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value."61 The practical implication of this change was sim-
ply to alter the burden of proof in future obscenity decisions. Whereas 
the Warren Court's "utterly without social value" criterion could be 
defeated by the barest assertion of "social value," the Burger Court's 
formulation required a much stronger showing of social value. 62 
Aside from tinkering with the details of applying the obscenity 
standard, the Burger Court opinions do not deviate in any major re-
spect from the prior Court's missives on the subject. The majority 
opinions in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre I contain extensive, heart-
felt paeans to the morality principle. Chief Justice Burger took great 
effort to point out that he was moving down a well-trod path. He 
began his Miller opinion with extensive quotes from Chaplinsky and 
Roth, which established the "two-level" analysis the Warren Court 
adopted to justify modem obscenity law.63 Burger then used this two-
level analysis to critique what he perceived to be the overly protective 
Memoirs test. After reestablishing an appropriately restrictive consti-
tutional test, Burger returned to the morality principle. "[T]o equate 
59. Miller, 413 U.S. at 21. 
60. The new factors were 
whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
state law; [and] whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value. 
413 U.S. at 24. 
61. 413 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). 
62. Some lower courts quickly took the hint. Only a year after Miller, the Supreme Court 
reversed a Georgia Supreme Court decision that had held the movie Carnal Knowledge obscene 
under a state law deemed by the state court "considerably more restrictive" than the flexible 
Miller standard. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 156 (1974). In an effort to rectify the evident 
misunderstanding of the new Miller standard, the Court was forced to emphasize descriptive 
terms carried over from the Warren Court era, such as "patently offensive," see A Book Named 
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General Of Massachusetts, 383 
U.S. 413, 418 (1965); Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962); and "hard-core," see 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Jenkins, U.S. at 
160 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 27) ("[N]o one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or 
exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard 
core' sexual content ..•• " ). 
63. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20-21. 
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the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with com-
mercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand concep-
tion of the First Amendment," Burger wrote.64 The alarums of the 
dissenters, Burger said, "cannot distinguish commerce in ideas, pro-
tected by the First Amendment, from commercial exploitation of ob-
scene material."65 The last portion of the Miller majority opinion 
contains the basic idea that academic sympathizers would later use to 
raise the two-level theory to a new level of sophistication; not only are 
certain kinds of speech immune from constitutional protection, but 
some things that are defended as first amendment "speech" are con-
ceptually indistinguishable from obviously inexpressive acts, and thus 
not "speech" at all. They are merely "commercial exploitation of ob-
scene material," and the states may therefore treat them like any other 
tainted articles of commerce. 66 
The Burger Court was not, however, concerned with the philo-
sophical intricacies of its doctrine. To the extent that the Burger 
Court majority issued any theoretical defense of its position, it relied 
largely upon attempted explanations of the Justices' visceral valua-
tions of obscene expression. One such explanation was offered by Jus-
tice Stevens in an opinion issued three years after Miller. 
[E]ven though we [have] recognized that the First Amendment will not 
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably 
artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type 
of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the in-
terest in untrammeled political debate . . . . Whether political oratory or 
philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, 
every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to 
speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and 
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sex-
ual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. 67 
As this excerpt indicates, Justice Stevens focused close attention on 
the value choices that had been left unelaborated by the Warren 
Court's nascent application of the morality principle. Furthermore, 
the Burger Court's increasingly clear exclusion of obscenity from the 
64. 413 U.S. at 34. 
65. 413 U.S. at 36. 
66. The Court drew an extended analogy between regulation of sexually explicit expression 
and the regulation of other commercial and business affairs. See 413 U.S. at 32 n.13; Paris Adult 
Theatre I. 413 U.S. at 61-64. The Court also discovered some irony in the opposing positions 
taken by the dissenters: "States are told by some that they must await a 'laissez-faire' market 
solution to the obscenity-pornography problem, paradoxically 'by people who have never other-
wise had a kind word to say for laissez-faire,' particularly in solving urban, commercial, and 
environmental pollution problems." Paris Adult Theatre I. 413 U.S. at 64 (quoting I. KR15fOL, 
ON THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA 37 (1972)). 
67. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
June 1988] Apologetics of Suppression 1579 
protection of the first amendment constituted an endorsement of ac-
tions by other political bodies restricting sexually explicit expression. 
Notwithstanding the language in the Burger Court majority opinions 
professing the Court's intended deference to legislative choices, the 
opinions provide abundant historical, political, and moral weight to 
one side of the legislative debate. The majority's references to federal-
ism interests further bolstered this message. "It is neither realistic nor 
constitutionally sound," Chief Justice Burger wrote in Miller, "to 
read the First Amenqment as requiring that the people of Maine or 
Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las 
Vegas, or New York City."68 The Court thus acknowledged that 
some pockets of resistance to mainstream morality remain. But it si-
multaneously asserted that the influence of this resistance could now 
be limited to the already hardened denizens of modern-day Sodom and 
Gomorrah: most of the country could still be saved from the moral 
depravity engendered by the libertine spirit. 
In adopting its present stance of severe moral advocacy, however, 
the Court must ignore the internal contradictions of its approach. For 
if the morality principle were followed to its logical end, and if the 
standards of the corrupt urbanites of Manhattan in fact no longer de-
fine the constitutional standard for the rest of the country, then the 
third part of the Miller test makes no sense. It is not logical to retain 
the view that the literary (or political, or scientific) merit discerned by 
a select few can salvage what to the vast majority of Americans merely 
seems to be evidence of sexual debasement. Indeed, the fact that sala-
cious materials are approved as "art" arguably makes them much 
more dangerous to the dominant ethos than any number of poorly 
made videocassettes representing a genre society regularly deplores. 69 
In the Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject of ob-
scenity, Pope v. Illinois, 10 it once again grappled with the question of 
social valuation, and once again it exhibited its discomfort at facing 
the implications of denying constitutional protection to obscenity. In 
Pope, the Court held that the "serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value" component of the Miller standard was not to be 
judged by the application of contemporary community standards. 
Rather, the intellectual values of a given work must be judged by a 
68. 413 U.S. at 32 (footnote omitted). 
69. See notes 182-85 infra and accompanying text. I will argue below that the present system 
avoids this problem in part by incorporating art into a socially approved, meliorating aesthetic. 
Art receives strong constitutional protection only because it has been successfully domesticated. 
See notes 266-73 infra and accompanying text. 
70. 107 s. Ct. 1918 (1987). 
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national standard, to be ascertained by asking "whether a reasonable 
person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole."71 The 
state had objected in its brief that the two standards would in practice 
amount to the same thing. The Court responded that "[t]he risk ... is 
that under a 'community standards' instruction a jury member could 
consider himself bound to follow prevailing local views on value with-
out considering whether a reasonable person would arrive at a differ-
ent conclusion."72 
On its face, therefore, the opinion seems to be a minor, albeit sig-
nificant expansion of the first amendment's protection. Upon closer 
inspection, however, Pope is more troubling. First, in determining 
that the intellectual value of a challenged work is to be determined by 
a national standard, the Court does little more than state what has 
long been the common understanding. 73 Second, the introduction of a 
"reasonable man" analysis into the determination of intellectual value 
may portend a constriction of the protections offered to fringe or 
avant-garde materials. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his Pope dis-
sent, "[t]he problem with [the majority's] formulation is that it as-
sumes that all reasonable persons would resolve the value inquiry in 
the same way."74 Furthermore, the "reasonable" person's judgment 
may not necessarily coincide with the opinion of members of the popu-
lation who have a professional interest in preserving access to material 
in their respective areas of expertise, such as artists, writers, art schol-
ars, scientists, and literary critics. "Certainly a jury could conclude 
that although those people reasonably find value in the material, the 
ordinary 'reasonable person' would not. "75 
Justice Stevens' reservations about the implications of Pope are 
quite compelling. But it must be said that if these fears are well 
founded, the case simply will have integrated the third component of 
the Miller standard into the intellectual scheme to which Stevens him-
self gave voice in American Mini-Theatres. 76 The two-level first 
amendment analysis, and the morality principle on which it is based, 
by definition eschews the value-skepticism Stevens sanctions in his 
Pope dissent. If expression may be arranged along a constitutional 
continuum according to its relative social value, and if the Court per-
71. 107 S. Ct. at 1921 (footnote omitted). 
72. 107 S. Ct. at 1921 n.3. But see 107 S. Ct. at 1926-27 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
73. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977). See also F. SCHAUER, THE LAW 
OF OBSCENITY 123-24 (1976). 
74. 107 S. Ct. at 1926 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
15. 107 S. Ct. at 1927 n.5. 
76. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. 
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mits the determination of value to be made based on society's ability to 
enforce through law the "social interest in order and morality,"77 then 
the battle has already been lost. No amount of remonstration about 
the protection of the unorthodox or the controversial can alter the fact 
that this interpretation of the first amendment gives the dominant 
members of society the right to govern such expression in order to 
enforce their moral code on the society as a whole - which inevitably 
leads to the suppression of unorthodox and controversial sexually ex-
plicit speech. 
In the final section of this article, I shall suggest that a regime of 
radical skepticism is the only possible response to the imperfections of 
the present model. First, however, it is necessary to investigate more 
closely the academic support that has been mustered in support of the 
restrictions on sexually explicit expression. The support provided by 
these commentators is significant given the Supreme Court's concen-
tration on the mechanics of obscenity law to the almost complete ex-
clusion of the theoretics. 
II. THE CONSERVATIVE CENSORS 
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the practical aspects of regulat-
ing pornography has left a theoretical vacuum to be filled by academic 
supporters of. the Court's basic conclusions. The efforts of conserva-
tive scholars to fill this vacuum have produced two distinct justifica-
tions for suppressing obscene expression. One theory relies on an 
analysis of the historical and structural roots of the first amendment, 
and finds that the amendment was never intended to protect nonpoliti-
cal expression of any sort. The other theory seeks to distinguish be-
tween "communication," which is afforded constitutional protection, 
and something else - "nonspeech" - which is denied constitutional 
protection. Both theories profess to base their legitimization of sup-
pression on a value-free assessment of the policies and purposes of the 
~ first amendment. But they take very different paths to this end. The 
first theory fully and explicitly embraces the morality principle, and 
for this reason has failed to gain acceptance by advocates of nonpro-
tection who find such forthrightness unpalatable or impolitic. The 
second theory has obtained greater support, in part because its propo-
nents share with the Supreme Court an unwillingness to confront the 
theory's roots in the morality principle. Efforts by the proponents of 
this theory to avoid the one fundamental issue in the obscenity area 
give the theory an air of pristine unreality, which is altogether consis-
77. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 u:s. 568, 572 (1942). 
1582 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1564 
tent with the intellectual gamesmanship that has characterized the ob-
scenity area from the outset. 
A. Pornography in the Constitutional Hierarchy 
The first theory justifying the suppression of pornography is based 
on a development of the hierarchy of first amendment values suggested 
by Alexander Meiklejohn.78 In his early theoretical writings, 
Meiklejohn asserted that the first amendment protected only public 
discussions of matters of public policy.79 Under this early articulation 
of his scheme, first amendment protection would be afforded only to 
expression that on its face addressed some issue of public political con-
cern; the tangential political importance of facially nonpolitical speech 
would not be sufficient to bring that speech within the ambit of the 
first amendment. 80 The highly circumscribed reach of this theory 
would necessarily deny protection to many works recognized as hav-
ing artistic, literary, or scientific value. 
This result was unacceptable to Meiklejohn, who had proposed his 
theory in order to substantiate the libertarian view that speech was 
"absolutely" protected. 81 In his later writings, therefore, Meiklejohn 
backtracked, contending that of course "novels and dramas and paint-
ings and poems" should be protected under the first amendment. 82 He 
arrived at this conclusion by adopting the attitude that the first 
amendment must protect not only political values, but also everything 
that goes into the makeup of a good political actor. Self-government is 
possible, Meiklejohn asserted, only if voters acquire "intelligence, in-
tegrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare."83 
Meiklejohn's "good citizenship" modification of his earlier theory al-
lowed him to cast his protective net much more widely. He now 
granted constitutional protection to thought and expression concern-
ing education, philosophy and science, literature and the arts - even 
that "which portray[s] sexual experiences with a frankness that, to the 
prevailing conventions of our society, seems 'obscene' .... " 84 But this 
78. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLmcAL FREEDOM (1960) (reprinting Meiklejohn's 1948 book 
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT). 
79. Id. at 24-28. 
80. Speech falling outside the parameters of the first amendment would obtain only limited 
due process protection. Id. at 34-38, 54-60. 
81. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CI'. REV. 245. 
82. Id. at 263. 
83. Id. at 255. 
84. Id. at 257, 262-63. Meiklejohn's reasons for protecting obscenity are not at all clear, even 
granting his "good citizenship" codicil to the first amendment hierarchy. Whatever can be said 
of obscenity, it does not seem to serve quite the same uplifting, character-building function as the 
other items on Meiklejohn's list. The protection of obscenity thus seems to be based on a tempo-
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key concession to his libertarian instincts robbed Meik1ejohn's early 
theory of its only substance, and transformed it into yet another varia-
tion of the Black/Douglas invocation that "speech is good." 
Meik1ejohn's original theory exerted a strong appeal, however, on 
other, more conservative commentators who did not shrink from the 
repressive implications of the first amendment hierarchy. Robert Bork 
provides the strongest example of this group. 85 Bork's variation on 
Meik1ejohn's hierarchy theory draws upon Herbert Wechsler's famous 
article on neutral principles. 86 Bork resorts to a "principled" view of 
free speech adjudication because the history and text of the first 
amendment provide little guidance. The Framers of the amendment 
"seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech," Bork says, 
therefore "[w]e are ... forced to construct our own theory of the con-
stitutional protection of speech."87 In order to avoid constitutionally 
illegitimate judicial lawmaking, the theory to be generated must con-
form to Wechslerian neutrality; principles "must be neutrally derived, 
defined and applied."88 
Bork's quest for neutral principles leads him to consider the vari-
ous benefits that have been proposed as derived from free speech. 89 He 
concludes that only one of these interests - "the discovery and spread 
of political truth" - provides a justifiable basis for judicial interven-
tion to protect speech.90 "All other forms of speech raise only issues 
of human gratification," the regulation of which should be left to the 
legislatures.91 Bork's view of constitutionally protected speech is fur-
ther defined by the limitation he places on the term "political truth." 
"Truth" in Bork's sense "is what the majority thinks it is at any given 
moment . . . . Political truth is what the majority decides it wants 
today. It may be something entirely different tomorrow, as truth is 
rediscovered and the new concept spread."92 Thus, not only is consti-
tutional protection denied to nonpolitical speech, it is also denied to 
those who express a desire to operate outside the preexisting political 
rary abandonment of the entire notion of a hierarchy, in favor of pure first amendment absolu-
tism: "Here, as elsewhere," Meiklejohn writes, "the authority of citizens to decide what they 
shall write and, more fundamental, what they shall read and see, has not been delegated to any of 
the subordinate branches of government." Id., at 262. 
85. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
86. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
87. Bork, supra note 85, at 22. 
88. Id. at 23. 
89. Id. at 24-26. 
90. Id. at 26 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). 
91. Id. at 26. 
92. Id. at 30-31. 
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structure to achieve something other than incremental change in the 
system.93 
Bork's system has the undeniable attribute of clarity. His nar-
rowly delimited definition of protected speech allows him to avoid the 
unconvincing circumlocutions employed by Meiklejohn in order to 
protect artistic and other nonpolitical expression within the first 
amendment hierarchy. Bork unequivocally makes such nonpolitical 
expression susceptible to regulation by federal and state legislatures. 
He rejects absolutely Meiklejohn's notion that such expression is con-
stitutionally significant in a political sense because it contributes to the 
formation of political values. This is irrelevant, Bork says, because 
"[o]ther human activities and experiences also form personality, teach 
and create attitudes just as much as does [literary expression]."94 
Since those other activities are clearly beyond the reach of the first 
amendment, Bork says, literary and artistic expression must be outside 
the amendment's scope as well. It's all just human gratification, and 
therefore subject to majority rule. 
Having denied protection to Ulysses and its rarefied ilk, Bork has 
no difficulty proscribing pornography as well: "constitutionally, art 
and pornography are on a par with industry and smoke pollution."95 
Bork also has no problem with the morality principle, because his en-
tire theory is built on the premise that legislative majorities have 
nearly absolute authority over every aspect of human expression save 
what concerns political governance, including matters entailing moral 
judgments. Judgments about social value "always involve[ ] a com-
parison of competing values and gratifications."96 These judgments 
therefore can never be principfod or neutral, and thus cannot be made 
by judges. 
· The disarming honesty of Bork's rendition of the morality princi-
ple has never found favor with the Court. On the contrary, the Court 
has behaved as if most nonpolitical expression has always been under 
the protective wing of the first amendment.97 The Court adopted the 
theory of a first amendment hierarchy in Chaplinsky,· 98 then, following 
93. "Speech advocating forcible overthrow of the government contemplates a group less than 
a majority seizing control of the monopoly power of the state when it cannot gain its ends 
through speech and political activity. Speech advocating violent overthrow is thus not 'political 
speech' ..•. " Id. at 31. 
94. Id. at 27. 
95. Id. at 29. 
96. Id. 
97. "[O]ur cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, 
economic, literary, or ethical matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment protection." 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). 
98. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky actually inaugurated 
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the lead of Professor Meiklejohn, it has proceeded abruptly to aban-
don that theory whenever its consequences turn out to be unsavory. 
Although it is possible to swallow a large dollop of theoretical incon-
sistency if the result is to require recalcitrant legislatures to permit the 
publication of Ulysses, the point made by Bork is impossible to avoid: 
both artistic regulation and the regulation of sexually explicit materi-
als are the products of social and moral value judgments. Logically, 
the legislature either has the power to make such judgments or it 
doesn't, and the fact that it is easier to arrive at damning moral judg-
ments about some materials than it is about others does not alter the 
nature of the judgment itself. The Court has refused to endorse Bork's 
explanation of the morality principle because his consistent applica-
tion of that principle returns censorship power to political bodies that 
have never demonstrated much intellectual discrimination in regulat-
ing expression. As lamentable as this might be, it is unavoidable under 
an honest application of the Court's present theory. 
B. Pornography as Nonspeech. 
Bork's theory is unsatisfactory to most of those seeking to justify 
the suppression of obscene publications because it explains the impli-
cations of the morality principle all too well. In one sense, the early 
censors were too effective; it is in iarge measure due to their zealotry 
that the morality principle cannot be brought out of the closet or ap-
plied consistently. The Comstocks of previous generations are the 
laughingstocks of the present era, and the one true legacy of their ef-
forts is an inherent hesitancy on the part of most judges and scholars 
to advocate censoring artistic or literary works whose merit might be 
fully recognized only fifty years hence. This intellectual squeamish-
ness manifests itself in the resort to a "scientific" explanation of cen-
sorship. The "scientific" approach looks to disciplines outside the law 
in order to justify censorship. It frees the advocates of censorship 
from the need to defend the value choices they have made in enforcing 
the "two-level theory." But levels, like prongs, have a way of multiplying in legal analysis, as 
evidenced by the development of first amendment law since Chaplinsky. Over the years the 
Court gradually adopted a series of gradations in first amendment law, ranging from highly 
protected speech, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (advocacy of political action), to 
speech receiving somewhat less protection, see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech), to speech entitled only to proce-
dural, rather than substantive protection, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(libel), to totally unprotected speech, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity). For 
the purposes of this article, it does not matter whether the Court employs a "two-level" theory, a 
"hierarchy" theory, or a "balancing" theory, see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The significant factor for my purposes is that the morality 
principle is the primary basis for all decisions allowing the suppression of pornography, regard-
less of the manner in which that principle has been applied by the Court. 
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the morality principle, because an airtight "scientific" explanation de-
nies that any such choice has taken place. 
The most prominent example of the "scientific" approach is char-
acterized by an attempt to explain pornography as "nonspeech." This 
theory refers to psychology, aesthetics, and linguistic philosophy in an 
effort to demonstrate that pornography has no communicative value, 
and therefore is not covered by the first amendment. This provides an 
unassailable rationale for the advocates of censorship, for the theory 
moves the debate to a different plane. It seeks to transform the debate 
about constitutional policy or the allocation of responsibility for moral 
determinations into an empirical matter of classification; the debate 
begins and ends with the factual question of whether an object ofregu-
lation is speech or nonspeech. 99 This theory was originally pro-
pounded in a 1967 law review article by John Finnis.t00 More 
recently, the theory has been adopted and slightly modified by Freder-
ick Schauer. tot The latter version of the theory is also the conceptual 
centerpiece of the constitutional law section of the Report of the At-
torney General's Commission on Pornography, toz part 2 of which ap-
parently was written largely by Schauer.103 There is also some 
indication that the theory has influenced the Burger Court. 104 
99. In Frederick Schauer's version of this theory, he tries to turn this characteristic into a 
libertarian virtue. He argues that by using a definition of "speech" that encompasses something 
less than "all uses of words" one enhances the protection available under the amendment to 
those forms of expression that remain within the protected classification. 
At the heart of a definitional approach to the first amendment is the idea that decreased 
pressure at the level of coverage is reflected in increased pressure at the level of protection. 
Ultimately, the argument of those who would narrow the scope of the first amendment is 
not for less protection, but for stringent protection of a more restricted area instead of 
weaker protection of a broader area. 
Schauer, supra note 38, at 908. But if, as I argue below, the proposed definition of "speech" 
neither reflects commonly held notions concerning the coverage of the first amendment nor is 
based on an intellectually plausible refutation of those commonly held precepts, then Schauer's 
proposal is revealed as infinitely manipulable and thus a threat to all speech. Viewed in light of 
its immediate consequences, the theory is merely another method of limiting the protections 
offered by the first amendment (and an especially dangerous one at that, if it is allowed to pose as 
a theory intended to protect speech). Protestations that one is cutting off the hand in order to 
save the arm are hardly dispositive if the hand is not injured in the first place. 
100. Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscen· 
ity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1967). 
101. Schauer, supra note 38. See also F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL EN· 
QUIRY 178-88 (1982) [hereinafter SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH]. 
102. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMN. ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
FINAL REPORT 251-69 (1986) [hereinafter PORNOGRAPHY COMMN. REP.]. 
103. Schauer was one of the Commission members. According to one report, Schauer re· 
jected an early draft written by the Commission's executive director Alan Sears because Sears 
had included much unreliable and lurid testimony, and had produced a "one-sided and oversim· 
plified" statement of the law. Hertzberg, Big Boobs, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 14 & 21, 1986, at 
22. Schauer then produced his own draft that served as the basis for part 2 in the final version. 
104. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 
939 (1974) (citing Finnis, supra note 100); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973). 
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The basic outline of the theory is remarkably simple. The theory 
turns on the ancient distinction between "reason" and "passion." In 
the original statement of the theory, Finnis asserted that there was a 
constitutionally significant difference between "two often competing 
aspects of the human mind: the intellect or reason and the emotions 
or passions."105 According to Finnis, the Supreme Court's early ob-
scenity opinions did indeed install a "two-level" theory of free speech, 
but the levels were not, as Professor Kalven 106 believed, based on the 
Court's subjective judgments of social value. Rather, the level of con-
stitutional protection offered to a particular instance of expression was 
defined by an objective analysis of whether the expression in question 
appeals to the "intellectual" aspect of the human mind or the "pas-
sionate" aspect. Finnis contends that the subjective, moralistic lan-
guage used by the Supreme Court is not to the contrary.107 Obscenity 
lacks "redeeming social importance,"108 Finnis writes, "precisely be-
cause it pertains, not to the realm of ideas, reason, intellectual content 
and truth-seeking, but to the realm of passion, desires, cravings and 
titillation. . . . The two constitutional levels of speech, in effect, are 
defined in terms of two realms of the human mind." 109 
Finnis cites sources ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Freud and 
Jacques Maritain in support of the reason/passion dichotomy.110 He 
implicitly acknowledges, however, that modem psychological analysis 
may have rendered such clean classical distinctions obsolete. Indeed, 
Finnis does not cite any empirical studies supporting the proposed dis-
tinction. Nevertheless, he retains the dichotomy. "Empirical psychol-
ogy could abandon the distinction between intellect and emotions 
105. Finnis, supra note 100, at 223. 
106. See Kalven, supra note 28. 
107. This account of the Supreme Court's standard is difficult to reconcile with Justice Bren-
nan's own highly subjective reading of the language in his early first amendment opinions. See 
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965). 
108. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). 
109. Finnis, supra note 100, at 227. In a recent article that resembles the Finnis theory in 
many respects, Frederick Schauer contends that the theory is consistent with the results of the 
Supreme Court's obscenity decisions. But he recognizes that the Court's statements about what 
it is doing do not always support this interpretation: 
In order fully to understand the Court's approach to obscenity, it is necessary to ignore 
much of what the Court has said about its approach, and look instead at what it has done. 
The Court has unwittingly encouraged criticism of its treatment by using language that is 
inconsistent with the method actually employed .••. 
Schauer, supra note 38, at 900 (emphasis in originial, footnotes omitted). See also PORNOGRA-
PHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 253-54. An alternative explanation, of course, is that the 
Court has wittingly said exactly what it means - i.e., that the regulation of morality is a permis-
sible justification for censoring expression. 
110. Finnis, supra note 100, at 227-29, 233 nn.69-70. 
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without the distinction being thereby invalidated either for common-
sense or for the philosophy of human nature."111 
The implicit concession that there may be no scientific evidence to 
support his theory is telling, for it reveals the manner in which Finnis 
utilizes his crucial distinction. Although he casts his argument in 
value-neutral terms, the reason/passion distinction is really not a "sci-
entific" measure at all. It is actually a metaphor by which courts are 
given the power to evaluate the subjective value of certain kinds of 
speech. In short, it is a tool to enforce the morality principle.112 
Finnis imputes to the courts the ability to distinguish between ap-
peals to reason and incitement of passion. In order to fulfill their as-
signed task, however, the courts are not required to assess empirically 
the effect of expression such as pornography on the intended recipi-
ents, or to determine that the dissemination of pornography has a dele-
terious effect on members of the society who choose not to expose 
themselves to sexually explicit materials. Rather, the nature of the 
expression itself is sufficient to justify suppression. The challenged 
material can be suppressed because the initial definition of protected 
speech excludes material of a certain type. But this begs numerous 
questions. No legal term is self-defining. Finnis' assumptions about 
the nature of speech (not to mention the nature of the human mind) 
are by no means uncontroversial. By using these assumptions to im-
pose one set of definitions and· then asking that the analysis proceed 
from that point, Finnis seeks to win his prize without a contest. Fin-
nis's standard is nothing more than the familiar neutral principles ar-
gument in another guise. It is an attempt to impose value judgments 
in the form of value-neutral terminology.113 Fundamental questions 
111. Id. at 227. 
112. For this reason, Finnis' contention that Roth altered the Hicklin standard is unpersua-
sive. Finnis asserts that the Hicklin standard contained two independent aspects. The first was 
that material could be suppressed if it corrupted the morals of members of society; the second 
was that material could be suppressed ifit tended to excite passions or was designed to encourage 
lascivious thoughts. See Finnis, supra note 100, at 225-26. Finnis contends that Roth dropped 
the former and adopted the latter as the sole modern criterion for the regulation of obscenity. 
But this interpretation can be supported only if one ignores the overwhelmingly moralistic tenor 
of Roth and subsequent opinions. Cf notes 19-77 supra and accompanying text. It is more 
accurate to read Roth and subsequent case8 as merely streamlining the Hicklin standard. Roth 
simply subsumed the corruption facet of Hicklin within the Court's new overall approach. The 
prevention of moral corruption was deemed in Roth to be a permissible legislative purpose under 
the first amendment, and morally corrosive material would be judged by its appeal to prurient 
interests. As noted previously, Roth and its progeny can be viewed as protective first amendment 
cases only to the extent to which they restricted the circumstances in which the morality princi-
ple could be applied; the principle itself survived those cases intact. See notes 19-77 supra and 
accompanying text. 
113. This is an increasingly popular tack among politically conservative constitutional theo-
rists. See Gey, A Constitutional Morphology: Text, Context, and Pretext in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 587 (1987). 
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may thus be decided without revealing the underlying premises or de-
fending the actual consequences of a particular approach. 
Frederick Schauer's update of this theory carries forward Finnis' 
conceptual framework. Schauer's task is to fill in some of the theoreti-
cal gaps left by his predecessor. However, Schauer's more elaborate 
rendition of the theory unearths even more problems than it solves. 
Finnis' presentation displayed the elegance of a simple argument rely-
ing on intuitive appeal. The argument succeeds or fails depending on 
the accuracy of Finnis' intuition that dirty books belong to the sphere 
of "passion" rather than that of "reason" and therefore are not 
"speech." In Schauer's hands the theory's one virtue is lost in the 
miasma of academese. Finnis included a few references to classical 
philosophy in order to demonstrate that many thoughtful people have 
shared his intuitive assessment of human psychology. Schauer, on the 
other hand, lades his argument with references to linguistic and ana-
lytic philosophy, seemingly to support the author's belief that his cen-
tral metaphor concerning the different aspects of the human psyche 
can be proved syllogistically. Again, this illustrates the theory's "sci-
entific" appeal: it translates interpretive arguments into the uncon-
troversial vernacular of value-neutral formalism. 
Instead of reinforcing the intellectual framework provided by Fin-
nis, Schauer's efforts actually undermine the argument by identifying 
the many specifics on which the theory is vulnerable. One example of 
Schauer's difficulties is provided by his attempt to bolster the most 
obvious weakness in Finnis' presentation. As noted previously, Finnis 
refused to rest his theory on empirical psychological analysis, choosing 
to rely instead on "common sense" and "the philosophy of human 
nature." 114 The philosophy of human nature on which he relies is, 
however, only superficially articulated 115 and fundamentally inade-
quate if divorced from the theory's intuitive appeal. 
Schauer attempts to rectify Finnis' failings in this regard by assem-
bling various strands of linguistic philosophy in support of his defini-
tion of "speech" within the context of the first amendment as a "term 
of art." 116 But the philosophical support Schauer musters for his the-
ory is relevant only in an elementary sense. Indeed, a more sophisti-
cated reading of the same philosophical materials indicates that they 
actually contradict the conclusions Schauer has drawn. For example, 
at one point Schauer writes that the "meaning is use" theory associ-
114. See text at note 111 supra. 
115. See Finnis, supra note 100, at 227-30. 
116. Schauer, supra note 38, at 902-19. 
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ated with the later Wittgensteiri is "implicit in this entire article."117 
It is true that the basic premise of Wittgenstein's late philosophy de-
nied that there is an absolute correlation between words and their ob-
jects, which led him to the conclusion that a definitive meaning for any 
particular word can never be ascertained.118 To this limited extent 
Wittgenstein's later linguistic philosophy is compatible with Schauer's 
theory. But Schauer uses Wittgenstein's linguistic relativism only 
when it suits him. He uses it initially in order to dispute the common 
view that sexually explicit expression must be "speech" under the first 
amendment because such expression is "speech" according to ordinary 
usage.119 He ultimately replaces that view with a definition of first 
amendment "speech" that does not encompass sexually explicit ex-
pression. By defining "speech" as used in the first amendment as any 
communication with cognitive content, Schauer is able to lump sexu-
ally explicit expression with a variety of other activities that everyone 
would agree are not covered by the first amendment: e.g., murder, 
rape, speeding, and littering.120. 
This deft sleight of hand owes more to Humpty Dumpty than to 
Wittgenstein: the word "speech" means just what Schauer chooses it 
to mean - neither more nor less.121 Schauer does not challenge the 
notion of objective meaning, as did Wittgenstein; rather, Schauer seeks 
to interpret the word "speech" in the context of the first amendment 
by replacing one objective meaning - that of ordinary usage - with 
another - communication with cognitive content. This effort contra-
dicts one of Wittgenstein's central premises. Wittgenstein's object was 
to free words from preordained, unchanging meanings. He intended 
to refocus linguistic analysis from objective meaning to the context in 
which meaning is ascribed, with special attention given to the frame of 
reference in which words are used.122 Two fundamental aspects of this 
frame of reference are the motive of the speaker and the consequence 
of the speech. The result of Schauer's new definition of "speech" is to 
place pornography beyond the reach of the first amendment, and thus, 
pornography may be banned by legislatures and its possession prose-
117. Id. at 908 n.54. 
118. See L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed. 
1958); L. WtTIGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS: PRELIMINARY STUDIES FOR THE 
"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS" (1958); L. WITrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (D. Paul & G. 
Anscombe trans. 1969). 
119. Schauer, supra note 38, at 905-10. 
120. Id. at 903. 
121. See L. CARROLL, THE PHILOSOPHER'S ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDER-
LAND & THROUGH THE LoOKING GLASS 193 (P. Heath ed. 1974). 
122. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 118, at 
1-23. 
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cuted. The discussion concerning the meaning of "speech" cannot be 
carried on without reference to those factors. The new meaning of 
"speech" offered by Schauer should be accepted only upon adoption of 
the policy of which it is a component. Yet Schauer proceeds as if 
"speech" were a disembodied concept, for which there can be an ob-
jective definition. Only after deriving an objective meaning for the 
term "speech" does he then apply that definition to sexually explicit 
expression. He therefore reaches his conclusion disingenuously; this 
conclusion has nothing to do with social policy, he implies, but rather 
is required by "a functional, purposive, and contextual view of the 
definitional process" in constitutional interpretation and is supported 
by a disinterested analysis of linguistic philosophy.123 
Schauer encounters problems from the outset in attempting to de-
fine first amendment "speech" instead of confronting the more difficult 
task of defending the policy of proscribing pornography.124 As evi-
dence that the Court has never protected all "speech" as the word is 
ordinarily used, Schauer cites several obvious examples, such as con-
spiracy, verbal betting, and perjury. 125 But in each of these examples, 
the speech itself is not the target of the state regulation. The speech is 
merely evidence that may be used to prove the violation of a law that 
is justified on grounds other than the regulation of speech, however 
broadly the term "speech" may be defined. These regulations may be 
described as speech-neutral; speech is simply one instrumentality by 
which a crime unrelated to expression is committed. Although issues 
of free speech may arise as a limit on the means by which these regula-
tions may be enforced, 126 issues of overbreadth or chilling effect do not 
123. Schauer, supra note 38, at 910. The counterintuitive nature ofSchauer's conclusion that 
sexually explicit speech is not "speech" also makes it vulnerable to Daniel Farber's critique of 
"brilliant" legal analysis. "If a theory is brilliant, by definition everyone in history prior to its 
discovery was systematically wrong about something." Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 10 
MINN. L. REv. 917, 924 (1986). Farber argues that universal error is unlikely, and therefore 
"brilliant" theories are usually false. The widespread acceptance of theories such as Schauer's 
indicates, however, that Farber was wrong to apply his critique to Mark Tushnet's observations 
concerning the nature of constitutional interpretation. See id. at 927-29. Tushnet has argued 
that constitutional terminology and precedent are fundamentally indeterminate; constitutional 
interpretation "leaves the judge free to enforce his or her personal values, as long as the opinions 
enforcing those values are well written." Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 819 (1983). The presumption of 
credibility given to claims of the nature that speech is not "speech" offers convincing support of 
Tushnet's analysis. 
124. Finnis specifically refused to mount any such policy defense, on the grounds that "any 
attempt to balance interests or even to articulate the rationale for proscribing obscenity, would be 
beyond judicial competence." Finnis, supra note 100, at 243. The logic of Schauer's analysis 
makes tb.e constitutional justification of censorship unnecessary, since the constitution does not 
even apply. 
125. Schauer, supra note 38, at 905. 
126. For example, a facially neutral statute may not be enforced in a manner that infringes 
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implicate the primary justifications for the regulations themselves -
i.e., preventing criminal activity, protecting the integrity of the judicial 
process, or prohibiting gambling. No such speech-neutral justification 
is available for the regulation of pornography. The regulation of por-
nography is intended solely to prohibit speech that is "designed to pro-
duce a purely physical effect."127 Schauer argues that the regulation 
of "hard-core" pornography is analogous to the regulation of "rubber, 
plastic or leather sex aids" and "[t]he mere fact that in pornography 
the stimulating experience is initiated by visual rather than tactile 
means is irrelevant if every other aspect of the experience is the 
same."128 But in order to analogize the regulation of pornography to 
the regulation of perjury, etc., some more clearly speech-neutral justifi-
cation must be presented for the regulation. That is Schauer's prob-
lem; the only plausible justification that has yet been offered for such 
regulation is the morality principle, which is neither speech-neutral 
nor compatible with a consistent interpretation of the first 
amendment.129 · 
Instead of addressing these problems, Schauer develops a scheme 
reminiscent of Finnis's distinction between reason and passion to jus-
tify lumping pornography with "nonspeech" activities ranging from 
murder to littering. The endpoints of Schauer's spectrum of commu-
nicative activities is similar to that in Finnis' treatment: on one end is 
the realm of pure reason (the "communication of ideas");13o on the 
other end is sexually explicit expression. But Schauer works a subtle 
change in Finnis' scheme. Schauer introduces a third category - the 
"emotive"131 - which is protected to the same extent as the commu-
nication of pure ideas. This change has profound significance, for, as 
Schauer recognizes, the use of language "to arouse feelings or emo-
tions, to induce someone to take action, to create a sense of beauty, to 
shock, [or] to offend" is also the use of language "for some purpose 
other than the exposition ofideas."132 These activities logically should 
fall on the "passion" side of the continuum, and should be subjected to 
unfettered regulation by the legislatures. So why does Schauer create 
a separate category to save "emotive" expression from such a fate? I 
suspect the answer has more to do with the practical need to recognize 
upon protected expression. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789 (1984). 
127. Schauer, supra note 38, at 922. 
128. Id. at 923. 
129. See notes 204-81 infra and accompanying text. 
130. Schauer, supra note 38, at 920. 
131. See id. at 921-22. 
132. Id. at 921. 
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as legitimate a large body of case law than it does with the intellectual 
requirements of Schauer's argument. The application of Finnis' sim-
ple dichotomy would invalidate a range of decisions, including those 
protecting artistic expression (Schauer acknowledges that some argue 
that art may not be communicative at all 133) and offensive speech.134 
Schauer's scheme leaves these cases intact while also providing a ra-
tionale for suppressing pornography. 
Schauer accomplishes this feat only at the expense of rendering an 
already questionable theory intellectually incoherent as well. By dilut-
ing the purity of the appeal to the intellect that figured so prominently 
in Finnis' theory, Schauer has undercut the entire point of Finnis' 
original analysis. If we are to take the Court's reference to ideas "with 
a grain of salt," and substitute in its stead the highly amorphous con-
cepts of "cognitive content," or "mental effect," or "appeal to the in-
tellectual process," thus permitting protection for "the artistic and the 
emotive as well as the propositional,"135 then the theory ceases to have 
any discernable meaning at all. It is senseless to protect all emotive 
aspects of expression except those of a sexual nature, unless one is 
making judgments about the relative quality or value of different emo-
tions. That is what occurs when the Court applies the morality princi-
ple, and although Schauer denies it, that is what his theory does as 
well. 
Obscenity, says Schauer, should be viewed "as essentially a physi-
133. Iii. at 922. 
134. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the words "Fuck the draft" on 
a jacket constitute constitutionally protected speech). Cohen was decided after Finnis published 
his article, but the language used by the Court in that case undercuts many of Finnis' assertions 
about the nature of the first amendment's protections. Compare Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 ("We 
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of indi-
vidual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may 
often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated."), with 
Finnis, supra note 100, at 230 ("It is •.• possible to draw a constitutional theorem from the basic 
thought of The Federalist: to the extent that expressions derive from the passion end of the 
reason-passion continuum, the rationale for their freedom disappears.") 
Finnis managed to protect artistic expression only by ignoring the art and concentrating on 
the ideas that art is intended to communicate. Finnis, supra note 100, at 230-37. His basic 
concept is that art does not "stimulate feelings," id. at 232, but rather "expresses ideas of feel-
ing." Id. at 233. Art is constitutionally protected because the observer must distance himself or 
herself from the artistic object in order to achieve a proper aesthetic appreciation of the ideas 
being communicated. Art cannot be properly appreciated in its original form: It must be dis-
tilled first, to remove matter alien to "intellectual" concerns. Any aspects of the art falling 
outside the narrow category composed of "ideas" are presumably filtered out by the process of 
distancing. Schauer nods approvingly in the direction of this extremely conservative view of art, 
but does not explicitly endorse it. See Schauer, supra note 38, at 922 n.136. This aesthetic theory 
is probably inherent in every pro-censorship proposal discussed in this article, including 
Schauer's. See notes 264-73 infra and accompanying text. 
135. Schauer, supra note 38, at 922. 
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cal rather than a mental stimulus."136 "Physical stimulus" often en-
tails some tactile element; something physically stimulates by actually 
touching the body. But Schauer declares that for first amendment 
purposes there is no difference between hard-core pornography and a 
rubber or plastic sex aid, because "[n]either means [of stimulation] 
constitutes communication in the cognitive sense."137 Thus, "the use 
of pornography may be treated conceptually as a purely physical 
rather than mental experience."138 But this simply does not describe 
human behavior in a way that anyone would recognize. Pornography 
must be seen by a conscious viewer; the viewer must read the prose (or 
watch the video) and translate the images into some mental diagram 
that then may well trigger some physical response. But the physical 
response cannot occur without the intercession of a series of mental 
processes. So how can this possibly be viewed as a "purely physical 
experience"? Furthermore, how can hardcore pornography possibly 
be viewed as more of a physical experience than wearing a jacket on 
which is sewn the phrase "Fuck the draft"?139 
In equating the reading or viewing of pornography with truly 
physical sexual experiences, Schauer also neglects a traditional distinc-
tion drawn between reading about a prohibited act and doing a prohib-
ited act. It is permissible to purchase and possess the "Anarchists' 
Cookbook"; it is not permissible to follow the instructions in that book 
by buying the ingredients of a Molotov cocktail and mixing up a few 
incendiaries on the kitchen table.140 The first amendment permits 
many things to be experienced second-hand through print or videotape 
that cannot be done in person. It is not constitutionally significant 
that the vicarious experience may produce in the viewer the same emo-
tions or responses as the act itself.141 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 923. 
138. Id. 
139. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
140. See United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1201-13 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., 
dissenting). 
141. Schauer's heavy emphasis on the response of the viewer of pornography is problematic 
in yet another way. In one attempt to explain the difference between protected sexually explicit 
expression and unprotected pornography, Schauer states that 
[A] speech act may have multiple effects. . • . [T]he result in the case of Lady Chatterly's 
Lover ••• is protected intellectual appeal and effect inseparably admixed with physical ap-
peal and effect . . . . The sexual stimulus in Lady Chatterley's Lover is only a side effect •••• 
Just as the government can censor noise but not a noisy political speech, as it can rigidly 
control automobile traffic but must be more circumspect in regulating parades and demon-
strations, so the government under the first amendment may censor physical stimulation but 
not mentally oriented art or literature producing physical stimulation. The essence of exclu-
sion of hardcore pornography under the first amendment is not that it has a physical effect, 
but that it has nothing else. 
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Despite his high-minded denials, Schauer ultimately fails to cloak 
the real justification for the interpretation of the first amendment he 
endorses. Schauer asserts that pornography may be suppressed be-
cause it lacks "a certain kind of value."142 Pornography can, he ad-
mits, have social value, but he says that that is not the question, the 
question is "whether it is speech," for some social value may also be 
found in "pollution, sex, political assassination, twelve-hour days, 
small children working at sewing machines, long hair, or short 
skirts."143 Presumably, then, the problem is that pornography has the 
wrong kind of social value. It is deleterious to the commonweal, like 
pollution and child labor. This analysis, however, is outside the realm 
of linguistic analysis and inside that dominated by the morality princi-
ple. The determination that "cognitive, emotive, aesthetic, informa-
tional, persuasive, or intellectual"144 expression is constitutionally 
protected while sexual expression is not involves an ordering of values, 
an assessment of moral worth, and a determination that some 
thoughts are bad thoughts, and therefore may be thwarted by any 
means available to the state. Schauer is correct when he states that the 
relevant precedent for his position is not a first amendment opinion, 
but rather Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney145 - the progenitor of 
Schauer, supra note 38, at 924-25 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). But the assertion 
that the sexual stimulus in Lady Chatterly's Lover is only a side effect is open to question. A side 
effect to whom? To Lawrence? To Schauer? To the average reader? To the film maker who 
used Lady Chatterley as the basis of a soft-core sex film? See Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents of the Univ. ofN.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959). Could it not be argued that since its publica-
tion the book has made a much larger spla5h as a sexual stimulus than as a piece ofliterature? If 
the likely response of the viewer of a book is the most significant factor in determining whether 
something has a purely physical appeal or also contains some intellectual appeal and is therefore 
constitutionally protected, then all of these questions are relevant. They indicate the difficulty in 
preventing Schauer's theory from encompassing a wide range of sexually explicit materials. 
Moreover, from Schauer's perspective, there is no compelling reason to allow the artistic 
merits of a book or movie to outweigh its probable effect on those who will probably constitute its 
audience. In fact, it seems more consistent with Schauer's theory to create a censorship calculus; 
if a book's sexual stimulus value is very high and its artistic value is very low, the logic seems to 
run in favor of censoring the book. As Schauer says, "there is no reason to believe that the 
recipient [of pornography] desires anything other than sexual stimulation." Schauer, supra note 
38, at 923. But is it not the case that a receptive reader/viewer of any sexually oriented work is 
likely to concentrate on its sexual content to the exclusion of other attributes? And if the recipi-
ent is likely to ignore whatever modicum of artistic merit the work may possess, should not the 
courts ignore it also? Schauer says that he intends to suppress material "not [because] it has a 
physical effect, but [because] it has nothing else." Id. at 925 (emphasis in original). But this 
assertion cannot be taken literally. If even the most minuscule intellectual appeal could save a 
work from suppression, then "a quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of [an obscene] book" 
could save it. See Kois v. Wisconsin, 4-08 U.S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam). Schauer obviously 
would not reach this result, so he must mean that a work's physical effect will be balanced 
against its artistic merit to some extent. The censorship calculus is unavoidable. 
142. Schauer, supra note 38, at 927 (emphasis omitted). 
143. Id. at 927. 
144. PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 268. 
145. 4-03 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd. mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
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Bowers v. Hardwick 146 For it appears to be Schauer's unstated posi-
tion that "The law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and 
if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated 
... the courts will be very busy indeed."147 It is possible to defend this 
position under some conceptions of the first amendment, 148 but not by 
repackaging speech as "speech.,, 
III. THE FEMINIST CENSORS 
Mainstream academics such as Frederick Schauer recently have 
been joined by a group of outre theorists led by Catharine MacK.innon 
who search for a justification of censorship unrelated to the morality 
principle. In one sense, the groups are quite distinct. MacK.innon has 
pursued a different remedial route to the suppression of pornography 
than that typically taken by her compatriots. MacK.innon represents a 
branch of feminist analysis that has sought to define pornography as 
discrimination against women. 149 MacK.innon, along with Andrea 
Dworkin, drafted an anti-pornography ordinance embodying this con-
146. 106 s. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
147. 106 S. Ct. at 2846; cf. Schauer, supra note 38, at 925-28. 
148. See Bork, supra note 85. 
149. Throughout this article I use the terms "obscenity" and "pornography" interchangea-
bly, as they are commonly employed, to refer to materials presently denied constitutional protec-
tion due to their sexual content. One idiosyncrasy exhibited by many of the diverse efforts to 
justify censorship of sexually explicit expression is a desire to separate "obscenity" from "por-
nography." Frederick Schauer, for example, initially used the distinction to emphasize his pro-
fessed respect for civil liberties. Schauer considers the common usage of the word "obscene" too 
imprecise and value-laden. Instead, he employs the term "hardcore pornography" in his discus-
sion of first amendment protection. Schauer, supra note 38, at 920 n.118. "The word 'obscenity' 
should be entirely excluded from any discussion of this area of the law. It is 'pornography' and 
not 'obscenity' that is the focus of the non-speech approach that the Court has adopted." Id. at 
920 n.119. But when Schauer's ideas were incorporated into the Pornography Commission Re-
port, the contrary assertion was made. It was said that some pornography was illegal and other 
pornography was not. PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 221. See also F. 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 101, at 179 ("Thus obscenity may or may not be porno-
graphic, and pornography may or may not be obscene."). At some point along the way, the 
point of Schauer's distinction has been lost. 
Catharine MacKinnon has made the same distinction between pornography and obscenity, 
but for entirely different reasons. To MacKinnon the concept of obscenity represents the inter-
vention of the first amendment where it does not belong; pornography is an act of discrimination, 
not an exercise of the ability to conceptualize and express ideas. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 
2 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 321, 322-25. The concept of obscenity, furthermore, is viewed as an 
instrument for the preservation of the dominant male power structure. It is, in fact, indistin-
guishable from the material it purports to regulate. "[T]he obscenity standard ••• is built on 
what the male standpoint sees. My point is: so is pornography. In this way, the law of obscenity 
reproduces the pornographic point of view of women on the level of Constitutional jurispru-
dence." Id., at 325 (emphasis in original). 
Each of the efforts to distinguish pornography from obscenity is obviously inextricable from 
the theory of suppression to which it is attached. Both are subject to the temptation that the 
Pornography Commission noted only in order to reject: "[I]t is tempting to note that 'pornogra-
phy' seems to mean in practice any discussion or depiction of sex to which the person using the 
word objects." PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 227. 
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cept, and providing for civil remedies against violators. After an un-
successful effort to pass such a statute in Minneapolis, 150 a version of 
this ordinance was passed by the city of Indianapolis. The latter ver-
sion was later held unconstitutional on first amendment grounds by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 151 The novelty of 
MacK.innon's method of attacking pornography masks the considera-
ble similarity between the conceptual basis of her approach and the 
more traditional analysis of Schauer and others. This theoretical con-
fluence is reflected in the Pornography Commission Report, which in-
cludes a section strongly endorsing the MacK.innon/Dworkin 
approach.152 The complementary relationship of the two perspectives 
is also marked by the fact that more traditional academic theorists 
favoring the censorship of pornography have begun to cite the Mac-
Kinnon analysis as ancillary support for their proposals.153 
A careful examination of MacK.innon's explanation of her position 
indicates that the feminist and traditional approaches to censorship 
are not the strange bedfellows they first seem. For example, MacK.in-
non shares the basic elements of the Finnis/Schauer view of pornogra-
phy. She sees no significant legal difference between the sex act and its 
representation on paper or videotape.154 Likewise, she shares the 
traditional theorists' narrow view of the first amendment. Both 
groups believe that the amendment simply does not (or, more accu-
rately, should not) apply to pornographic materials. Therefore, 
MacK.innon and the conservatives agree, legislatures should be free to 
draft laws regulating or proscribing pornography without judicial in-
terference.155 MacK.innon also shares with the more extreme conserv-
atives (such as Robert Bork) the view that legislative power to regulate 
sexually explicit speech extends even into the realm of literary and 
150. The statute was passed twice by the Minneapolis City Council, but was vetoed both 
times by the mayor. See Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The 
Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1987). 
151. American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (1985), ajfd., 106 S. Ct. 1172 
(1986). 
152. PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 747-56. The Commission's conclu-
sions regarding the harm done by pornography also reflect the influence of MacKinnon. See 
generally id. at 299-351. 
153. See, e.g., Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 589-
602. 
154. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 19 
(1985) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Civil Rights]; MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 335. 
155. Although MacKinnon's efforts have concentrated on her civil rights statute, everything 
she has written suggests that she would prefer the most direct approach to regulating pornogra-
phy. Her civil rights statute is merely one means by which to circumvent judicial rulings that 
prevent the implementation of the preferred direct regulation. 
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artistic expression. 156 Finally, given the broad theoretical territory she 
occupies in common with the conservative theorists, it is no surprise 
that MacKinnon also shares their main failing. Like the conserva-
tives, her efforts to justify the control of pornography amount to little 
more than an elaborate apologia for the morality principle. 
There are, of course, differences as well as similarities between the 
MacKinnon and the conservative approaches to censorship. The ma-
jor difference lies in MacKinnon's motive for controlling pornography. 
MacK.innon views pornography as the source of gender inequality in 
society. Her attack on pornography is "part of a larger project that 
attempts to account for gender inequality in the socially constructed 
relationship between power -,.. the political - on the one hand and 
knowledge of truth and reality - the epistemological - on the 
other."157 The conservatives display antagonism toward sexual ex-
pression of every sort. MacK.innon displays antagonism only toward 
sexual expression involving women. Moreover, while Schauer con-
ceives pornography in solipsistic terms (i.e., as a masturbatory aid), 
MacK.innon concentrates on the social functions of porn. Pornogra-
phy "constructs the social reality of gender,"158 by which MacK.innon 
seems to mean not merely that pornography reflects the sexual in-
equality endemic in society generally, but rather the more radical 
proposition that pornography actually produces this inequality by 
"constructing" reality. 
The description of pornography as producing sexual inequality 
provides MacK.innon the opportunity to deny any allegiance to the 
morality principle. As the title of one of her articles asserts, pornogra-
phy is "not a moral issue."159 She attempts, instead, to justify the 
regulation of pornography on the basis of a harm principle. 160 Mac-
Kinnon identifies three distinct categories of harm. The first two cate-
gories of harm are organized around a fairly traditional argument. 
This argument states that pornography commits violence against wo-
men.161 The two categories of harm refer to separate groups of women 
156. See notes 182-85 infra and accompanying text. 
157. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 325 (footnote omitted). 
158. MacKinnon, Civil Rights, supra note 154, at 7. 
159. MacKinnon, supra note 149. 
160. I again refer to the concepts articulated by Joel Feinberg. Feinberg defines the hann 
principle as follows: "It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would 
probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) hann to persons other than the actor 
[and that it is a necessary means to that end]." FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, supra note 14, at 
26. 
161. The concept here is only "fairly" traditional because the usual argument asserts that 
pornography provokes, and therefore indirectly results in, the commission of violence against 
women. In MacKinnon's conception, however, pornography does not instigate, it acts. The 
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identified as subject to this violence. Category 1 includes women who 
participate in the making of pornography. Category 2 includes all 
other women in society who are harmed as a direct consequence of the 
distribution of pornography. Unfortunately, the evidence produced in 
support of the first two categories of harm fails to sustain MacKin-
non's reliance on the harm principle. MacK.innon must therefore rely 
upon her third, and more esoteric, category. This category is based on 
her basic premise that pornography "constructs" reality. There are 
serious epistemological problems with this notion, as well as problems 
of political consistency. In the end, her difficulties lead MacK.innon to 
rely directly (if not avowedly) upon the morality principle. 
A. Pornography and the Identification of Harm 
MacK.innon's allegations concerning the first group of women in-
jured by pornography can be answered relatively easily. MacK.innon 
makes the indisputable assertion that "[w]omen are known to be bru-
tally coerced into pornographic performances."162 Linda Lovelace's 
experience during the filming of Deep Throat is the commonly cited 
example.163 But MacK.innon's response to this problem - to ban all 
pornography - does not necessarily follow from the existence of the 
problem itself. 164 In the first place, MacK.innon does not consider the 
harm identified by MacKinnon is the very existence of the pornography itself. In MacKinnon's 
world pornography takes on a life of its own, no longer requiring human intervention in order to 
perpetrate its harms. 
162. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 339. 
163. L. LoVELACE, ORDEAL (1980). See MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 339 n.55; PORNOG-
RAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 866 n.1006. 
164. The problem itself is more complicated than MacKinnon is willing to acknowledge. 
The Lovelace case is easy, since the victim claims that she was psychologically and physically 
coerced into participating in the production of pornographic movies. But other pornographic 
film actors who testified before the Commission adamantly denied the existence of coercion. See 
PORNOGRAPHY COMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 868 n.1012. I infer from MacKinnon's writ-
ings that she would respond to testimony of this nature by noting that coercion does not have to 
be physical or overt; it can also take the more subtle form of adverse socialization. This is one 
implication of MacKinnon's notion that pornography "constructs" reality. See notes 186-203 
infra and accompanying text. She seems to believe, therefore, that the women who do not view 
themselves as coerced are the ones who have been coerced most successfully. This view is deeply 
demeaning to all the women who do not agree with MacKinnon. Cf. PORNOGRAPHY COMMN. 
REP., supra note 102, at 194 (statement of Judith Becker, Ellen Levine, and Deanne Tilton-
Durfee) ("We reject any judgmental· and condescending efforts to speak on women's behalf as 
though they were helpless, mindless children.") It carries a heavy residue of paternalism, which 
in fact permeates all of MacKinnon's work. The proposition that male-dominated social condi-
tioning leads to the development of false consciousness among women is a recurring theme in 
MacKinnon's writings. See, e.g., c. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 
198 (1987). One measure of the paternalism evident in a particular theory is the extent to which 
that theory rejects the Volenti maxim. (" Volenti non fit injuria. A person is not wronged by that 
to which he consents." 3 J. FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO 
SELF 11 (1986) [hereinafter FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF].) MacKinnon necessarily denies the 
validity of the Volenti maxim, since she asserts that "consent" can never be given freely by wo-
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existence of other remedies for the violations that undoubtedly take 
place. A variety of other remedies may be applicable: criminal sanc-
tions such as kidnapping, sexual battery, or contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor; traditional civil tort sanctions such as false 
imprisonment or battery; or new variations of remedies for invasion of 
privacy or the right of publicity.165 MacK.innon does not explicitly 
answer Justice Brandeis' assertion that where speech is alleged to in-
cite illegal behavior "the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent 
crime are education and punishment for violations of the law."166 If a 
response may be implied from the general thrust of MacKinnon's ar-
gument, however, it is that the legal system cannot be relied upon to 
redress such claims adequately. This response is inadequate. 
Although it may be true that existing remedies should be applied more 
rigorously, it is also the case that MacK.innon's own preferred remedy 
does nothing at all to address the real problems of the women who 
tend to become involved in the making of pornography. The women 
who perform in pornography tend to be young, poorly educated, and 
impoverished individuals who are often escaping from an abusive - if 
not life-threatening - family background.167 MacK.innon's solution 
would, at best, remove one opportunity for exploitation, only to leave 
the victims susceptible to virtually certain exploitation in another con-
text. Her solution is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient to ad-
dress the very real, pressing, and particularized harm she has 
identified. 
The performers in pornography are not, however, the primary fo-
cus of MacK.innon's analysis regarding the direct violence done to wo-
men. She is more deeply concerned with the second group of victims. 
This group is composed of all women in society. MacK.innon asserts 
that women have suffered direct sexual subjugation resulting from the 
distribution of sexually explicit books and movies. The problem with 
this aspect of her analysis is that no one has been able to demonstrate 
that identifiable, physical harms result directly from pornography. A 
short analysis of the evidence produced by the Commission (which 
men who do not adequately understand their own subordination. Her theory is, therefore, highly 
paternalistic. 
165. One recent attempt to develop the latter possibility can be found in Colker, Published 
Consentless Sexual Portrayals: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 39 
(1986). 
166. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), o•·erruled, 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
167. The Commission acknowledged the preponderance of these factors among performers 
in pornography. PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 855·61. 
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incorporates much of the MacKinnon point of view on this subject) 
will illustrate this point. 
The Commission divided the universe of sexually explicit materia1s 
into four groups: sexually violent materia1; nonviolent materia1s de-
picting degradation, domination, subordination, or humiliation; nonvi-
olent and nondegrading materia1s; and nudity.168 The Commission 
found that materia1 in groups 1 and 2 is definitely harmful. Group 3 
was the subject of much dispute within the Commission, and so re-
ceived a compromise verdict stating that "[w]e unanimously agree that 
materia1 in this category in some settings and when used for some pur-
poses can be harmful."169 Only simple nudity escaped relatively un-
scathed. The Commission concluded that, in genera], simple nudity 
was not harmful.170 
By phrasing its conclusions in this manner, the Commission moved 
forcefully in the direction of the harm principle. This movement to-
ward a harm ana1ysis received its impetus from the MacKinnon ap-
proach. A large portion of the group 2 materia1s includes "materia1 
that, a1though not violent, depicts people, usually women, as existing 
solely for the sexua1 satisfaction of others, usually men, or that depicts 
people, usually women, in decidedly subordinate roles in their sexua1 
relations with others,"171 a description that coincides with one of the 
more abstract components of the MacKinnon/Dworkin lega1 defini-
tion of pomography.112 
Having recognized the attractiveness of the harm principle in at-
tempting to justify the suppression such "degrading" expression, the 
Commission defined "harm" in the broadest possible terms: 
[W]e certainly reject the view that the only noticeable harm is one that 
causes physical or financial harm to identifiable individuals. An environ-
168. Id. at 320-49. 
169. Id. at 346. 
170. Even with regard to nudity, however, the Commission hedged its bets: "There may be 
instances in which portrayals of nudity in an undeniably sexual context, even if there is no sug-
gestion of sexual activity, will generate many of the same issues [as those relating to groups 1 
through 3]." Id. at 347. 
171. Id. at 331. 
172. The MacKinnon/Dworkin definition of pornography includes depictions of "graphic 
sexually explicit subordination of women" in which "women are presented dehumanized as sex-
ual objects, things or commodities ••.. " MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 321 n.1. The introduc-
tion of an amorphous "degradation" factor into group 2 explains why the Commission could 
dismiss as inconsequential the dispute over the harmful effects of group 3 materials. "[T]he class 
of materials that are neither violent nor degrading is at [sic] it stands a small class, and many of 
these disagreements are more theoretical than real." PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 
102, at 347. In other words, by including "degrading" materials in group 2, the Commission 
emptied group 3 of almost all content. "[E]rotica of the Playboy-Penthouse variety •.. suddenly 
became 'degrading' - and therefore, in the commission's view, subject to suppression." Hertz-
berg, supra note 103, at 23. 
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ment, physical, cultural, moral, pr aesthetic, can be harmed, and so can a 
community, organization, or group be harmed independent of identifi-
able harms to members of that community. 173 
Only by defining "harm" so broadly could the Commission reach its 
desired result. Moreover, by stating the harm principle so expan-
sively, the Commission inadvertently segues right back into the moral-
ity principle. "To a number of us, the most important harms must be 
seen in moral terms, and the act of moral condemnation of that which 
is immoral is not merely important but essential."174 
The Commission's conclusions regarding the first two groups of 
materials advert to a narrower type of harm that is specific enough to 
give meaning to an argument for suppression based on the harm prin-
ciple - i.e., individual, identifiable, physical harms that would not 
occur but for the effect of pornography. The Commission purported 
to find "a causal relationship between exposure to material of this type 
and aggressive behavior towards women," 175 which in turn was found 
to lead to "an increase in the level of sexual violence directed at wo-
men. "176 But this relationship is neither supported by the evidence, 
nor justified by any systematic treatment in the Report of the relevant 
sociological data on which the Commissioners relied. 177 Indeed, the 
Commission did not profess to rely primarily upon clinical evidence 
linking pornography to specific acts of sexual violence. Instead, the 
Commission relied upon its all-inclusive definition of "harm," along 
with assumptions "plainly justified by our own common sense"178 
about the likelihood that the attitudes induced by pornography would 
lead to sexual violence against women. The Commission's concentra-
tion on the anti-social attitudes engendered by pornography under-
173. PORNOGRAPHY COMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 303. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 324. 
176. Id. at 325. 
177. The Commission's slipshod research and overstatement of the supporting data has been 
recounted elsewhere. See B. LYNN, POLLUTING THE CENSORSHIP DEBATE: A SUMMARY AND 
CRITIQUE OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOG· 
RAPHY 75-88 (1986). The Commission, which did not authorize a systematic study of the extant 
social sciences data, reached conclusions exactly opposite to those reached on this point by a 
study of the data commissioned in 1985 by Canada's Fraser Commission. See McKay & Dollf, 
The Impact of Pornography: An Analysis of Research and Summary of Findings, in WORKING 
PAPERS ON PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION, Report No. 13 (1985). Two members of the 
Pornography Commission dissented from the Commission's findings, and objected to the misuse 
of data to establish a causal relationship between pornography and violence against women. "[I]t 
is essential to state that the social science research has not been designed to evaluate the relation-
ship between exposure to pornography and the commission of sexual crimes; therefore efforts to 
tease the current data into proof of a causal link between these acts simply cannot be accepted." 
PORNOGRAPHY COMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 204 (statement of Dr. Judith Becker and Ellen 
Levine). 
178. PORNOGRAPHY COMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 325. 
June 1988] Apologetics of Suppression 1603 
scores its ultimate resort to the morality principle to justify its policy 
of suppression. No meaningful rendition of the harm principle can 
justify the state's regulation of the attitudes and world views of its 
citizens. A policy of that nature must be justified on other grounds. It 
must be justified by a scheme that permits some apparatus of the state 
to certify and enforce a set of proper attitudes; i.e., it must be justified 
under some variation of the morality principle. 
The MacKinnon analysis of pornography shares the Commission's 
strong emphasis upon the linkage between pornography and negative 
attitudinal development. Indeed, MacKinnon is somewhat more 
forthcoming than the Commission about the inconclusive nature of 
the evidence regarding the connection between pornography and sex-
ual violence.179 Frustration at the failure of the social sciences to pro-
vide evidence to support this linkage leads MacKinnon to attack the 
concept of causation itself, 180 and especially the use of strict causation 
179. "Courts and commissions and legislatures and researchers have searched largely in vain 
for the injury of pornography in the mind of the (male) consumer or in 'society,' or in empirical 
correlations between variations in levels of 'anti·social' acts and liberalization in obscenity laws." 
MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 339 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 324 n.9, 339 n.57. 
180. See id. at 338-39. The Commission, which faced the same problems of proof, responded 
in the same fashion. See PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 306-12. MacKin-
non's critique of causation is more theoretical than that of the Commission, but it is also more 
unclear. Her argument seems to boil down to one of two propositions. The first is that the effects 
of pornography are so pervasive that the harms pornography perpetrates can no longer be per-
ceived as such by those operating within the system of thought it engenders. The harm done by 
pornography thus cannot be subjected to traditional analyses of cause and effect. Causes cannot 
be isolated because women are not harmed individually, "but as members of the group 'wo-
men.' " MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 338. This aspect of MacK.innon's critique is a good 
example of the theoretical defenses that are built into her work. Women who do not see the 
harm of pornography, MacKinnon asserts, are dupes. Their perspective is warped by the condi-
tioning to which they have been subjected since birth. Men ignore the harm done by pornogra-
phy because it is in their interest to do so. In either case, criticism of MacKinnon's approach is · 
damned from the outset by the irrefutable claim of bad faith. The second proposition implied by 
MacK.innon's critique of causation also exemplifies this tendency. The second proposition as-
serts that harm cannot be causally linked with pornography because the two are indistinguish-
able. "Pornography and harm may not be two definite events anyway; perhaps pornography is a 
harm." Id. at 338 n.53. This handy tautology is hermetically sealed against all attacks. Mac-
Kinnon follows in the footsteps of Frederick Schauer: if one defines the terms of discussion in 
just the right way, the proper conclusions fall into place quite logically. 
The answer to MacKinnon's animadversions regarding causation actually can be found in 
one of her own citations. She cites an essay by Morton Horwitz describing the use of "objective" 
causation in the nineteenth century to prevent plaintiffs from using tort law as a redistributive 
mechanism. Horwitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LA w: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRmQUE 201 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). One point of the essay is that legal concepts such 
as causation are bound up with the policy objectives they advance. The use of causation in first 
amendment law is not, as MacK.innon asserts, "an attempt to privatize the injury pornography 
does to women in order to insulate the same system from the threat of gender equality, also a 
form of redistribution." MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 338-39. Rather, the use of strict causa-
tion requirements in the first amendment area can be explained much more plausibly (and much 
less insidiously) as reflecting the modem Court's reluctance to increase the state's power to regu-
late expression of any sort. See note 181 infra. MacK.innon's haste to discard the concept of 
strict causation in this area thus may have ramifications far beyond those she discusses. These 
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requirements to protect expression under the first amendment. 181 Her 
primary response to the problems posed by the inadequate evidence, 
however, is to embrace with relish the notion that the state should 
rigorously control the attitude-shifting effects of pornography. 
The MacK.innon view reduces all expression to its explicit or im-
plied position on one issue - the subjugation of women. If the expres-
sion carries the wrong message on this issue, then the expression may 
be properly suppressed.182 Other measures of value do not come into 
ramifications are the real issue here, which MacKinnon's focus on the abstract theory of causa· 
tion permits her to avoid. 
181. "First Amendment logic," MacKinnon writes, "like nearly all legal reasoning, has diffi· 
culty grasping harm that is not linearly caused in the 'John hit Mary' sense." MacKinnon, supra 
note 149, at 337. She seems to believe that the strict causation limitation on state efforts to 
control expression was generated by the Court's desire to protect pornography. "It is difficult to 
avoid noticing that the ascendancy of the specific idea of causality used in obscenity law dates 
from around the time that it was first believed to be proved that it is impossible to prove that 
pornography causes harm." Id. at 337-38 (footnote omitted). In fact, the strict requirement of 
direct causation in first amendment law has a somewhat less nefarious lineage. It first appeared 
as a limitation on the extent to which the state could prohibit or prosecute radical speech. See 
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), revd., 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This aspect of the 
requirement has survived in the form of the modern Brandenburg test, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969), and has served to protect the expression of many activists for whom Mac· 
Kinnon presumably feels some sympathy. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per 
curiam) (antiwar protestors); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (civil rights supporter); 
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (civil rights demonstrators). MacKinnon's contrary, 
more lenient view of first amendment causation holds that speech is harmful if it creates an 
atmosphere or context in which direct injuries are legitimized. See MacKinnon, supra note 149, 
at 337-38. This view is not, as MacKinnon seems to believe, an incisive or radical critique of the 
present court's conservative ideology. It is, rather, nothing less than a throwback to a much 
more conservative era, in which the mere statement of "bad" or "dangerous" ideas could be the 
basis for criminal sanctions, without regard to the probable consequences of the expression. 
182. This is a classic example of viewpoint-based discrimination, which has traditionally re· 
ceived the strictest scrutiny under the first amendment. See Stone, Content Regulation and the 
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. R.Ev. 189, 200-33 (1983). For an application of this 
principle in obscenity law, see Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. ofN.Y., 360 U.S. 
684 (1959); see also Stone, Antipomography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. 
J.L. & Pus. POLY. 461 (1986). Although MacKinnon does not see much value in first amend· 
ment analysis generally, see note 181 supra, she nevertheless consistently denies that her ap· 
proach constitutes viewpoint discrimination. However, her denials rarely rise above a typical 
admixture of ad hominem claims of bad faith on the part of those who disagree. See, e.g., C. 
MACKINNON, The Sexual Politics of the First Amendment, supra note 164, at 212: "When do 
you see a viewpoint as a viewpoint? When you don't agree with it. When is a viewpoint not a 
viewpoint? When it's yours ...• The reason Judge Easterbrook saw a viewpoint in [the Indian· 
apolis civil rights statute] was because he disagrees [sic] with it." 
Cass Sunstein has recently attempted to rescue MacKinnon from the viewpoint-discrimina· 
tion trap. Sunstein, supra note 153, at 609-17. Sunstein identifies three factors that are helpful in 
identifying viewpoint-based legislation: "the connection between means and ends"; "the nature 
of the procesS by which the message is communicated"; and "whether the speech is low· or high· 
value." Id. at 616. Sunstein applies these factors to antipomography legislation, and concludes 
that the legislation does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. This analysis is flawed for 
reasons that have already been discussed. The application of the first factor asserts the state's 
ability to regulate harm. Id. It thus relies on evidence of harm stemming from pornography, 
which the social sciences have not yet been able to provide. See note 177 supra. The second 
factor assumes that speech appealing to "noncognitive capacities" deserves less protection than 
other speech. Id. at 606, 616. This relies on the distinction drawn by Frederick Schauer, and is 
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play, and matters such as artistic or literary worth evidently cannot 
salvage noncompliant expression. Indeed, MacK.innon contends that 
these other measures of value are part of the whole, corrupt system. 
"[I]f a woman is subjected, why should it matter that the work has 
other value? Perhaps what redeems a work's value among men en-
hances its injury to women. Existing standards of literature, art, sci-
ence and politics are, in feminist light, remarkably consonant with 
pornography's mode, meaning and message."183 
The refusal to distinguish between pornography and other types of 
expression is a necessary characteristic of MacK.innon's position. No 
theory can consistently justify the suppression of sexually explicit 
materials on the ground that they reflect (or, from MacK.innon's per-
spective, create) the hierarchical relations of an undesirable social 
structure, and simultaneously preclude suppression of artistic speech 
that reflects (or creates) the same undesirable social attributes. In-
deed, as MacK.innon honestly admits, she does not desire to protect 
legitimately artistic works that reflect existing relations of sexual dom-
inance.184 MacK.innon's main target is not pornography as such, but 
rather the "ideology" embodied in and communicated by pornogra-
phy. Conventional artistic expression that portrays women in a derog-
atory light must therefore be considered even more dangerous than 
porn, because art carries the additional message of social legitimacy. 
Artistic expression and pornographic expression both reflect the 
society in which they are produced. Both forms of expression will 
therefore often reproduce and bolster the attitudes of males who seek 
to continue their historically dominant position in society.185 But un-
like pornography, art provides an extra increment of support for the 
invalid for the reasons discussed above. See notes 113-48 supra and accompanying text. The 
third factor begs the question in the manner of all hierarchical theories of first amendment pro-
tection. If something is defined preemptively as "low-value speech," it is a pretty good bet that 
the speech can easily be found to have forfeited its constitutional protection. 
183. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 332-33. 
184. Courts' difficulties framing workable standards to separate ..• obscenity from great 
literature make the feminist point. These lines have proven elusive in law because they do 
not exist in life. Commercial sex resembles art because both exploit women's sexuality. The 
liberal's slippery slope is the feminist totality. Whatever obscenity may do, pornography 
converges with more conventionally acceptable depictions and descriptions like rape does 
with intercourse because both express the same power relation. 
MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 334. 
185. Although MacKinnon denies it, neither all art nor all pornography carries the same 
bias. Just as some art challenges present social arrangements of male dominance, so does some 
pornography. This point is articulated forcefully in Brief Amici Curiae of the Feminist Anti-
Censorship Taskforce, American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (No. 
84-3147), affd., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). MacKinnon's rigid treatment of all art and pornography 
as ideologically tainted leads her to ignore the imperfect, multidimensional, and often contradic-
tory nature of human expression. 
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system of dominance. It puts the imprimatur of social legitimacy on 
dominance. It not only communicates a single author's view that 
"women should be subordinated," but also the much more oppressive 
message that "the subordination of women is approved by society at 
large." If it is the negative attitudinal effects of literary or visual ex-
pressions of dominance with which MacKinnon is primarily con-
cerned, then artistic expression should be the first target, since its 
effect is far more powerful than "outlaw" expression such as pornogra-
phy. Although pornography communicates values of sexual domina-
tion, it nevertheless undermines those values by communicating its 
own antisocial nature. 
From MacKinnon's perspective, therefore, it should be much more 
important to suppress the works of Henry Miller or Last Tango in 
Paris than it is to eliminate the likes of Debbie Does Dallas. Works 
portraying sexual domination accorded "legitimate" artistic status not 
only reach a far greater number of people than do works with porno-
graphic content, but they transmit their message to readers or viewers 
who are receptive to the dissemination of the social values in those 
works. If someone reads a book in school, or checks it out of a library, 
or goes to see a critically acclaimed movie, the person naturally treats 
the message of that material in a fundamentally different way from the 
message communicated by a bawdy video checked out of an "adults-
only" store in a bad section of town. 
B. Pornography and the "Construction" of Reality 
The primary difficulty with MacKinnon's analysis is much more 
serious than her inability to distinguish art from porn. The principal 
flaw can be found in her main premise, the leitmotif of all her work; 
this premise is based on MacKinnon's notion that pornography "con-
structs" reality. 186 "Pornography," MacKinnon writes, "is not im-
agery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a 
distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation or 
symbol either. It is sexual reality." 187 For Frederick Schauer and the 
Meese Commission, pornography is something more than speech. For 
MacKinnon, pornography is reality. Both views ascribe extraordinary 
powers to expression. Words and images take on fearsome attributes. 
They can literally drive history, by "constructing" entire political, eco-
nomic, and social structures. 
For the conservatives, this imputation of power to speech is at least 
186. See notes 159-61 supra and accompanying text. 
187. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 326-27. 
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consistent with the views of an earlier generation of conservatives, 
which believed that the Yiddish leaflets of Jacob Abrams posed a seri-
ous social threat. 188 But for Catharine MacKinnon, who professes at 
least a passing admiration of Marxism, putting the ideological cart 
before the socioeconomic horse is downright bizarre.189 In MacK.in-
non's view, all social conditions are rooted in the expression that ac-
companies them. "Pornography can invent women because it has the 
power to make its vision into reality, which then passes, objectively, 
for truth." 190 MacKinnon's theory proceeds only after removing por-
nography from its social context. Pornography does not service appe-
tites produced by an unequal society, according to MacKinnon, it 
actually creates the unequal society. Pornography is the first cause, 
the prime mover, of all sexual inequality. 
As with other aspects of her thought, MacKinnon views this as a 
unique and progressive critique of the status quo. She is fond of con-
trasting this critique with the standard "liberal" legal theory that cre-
ated the obscenity doctrine she finds so entirely inadequate to the task 
188. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
189. I recognize that this rigid dichotomy somewhat caricatures both MacKinnon and Marx. 
Both the MacKinnonite and Marxist theories recognize some dialectical relationship between 
objective reality and subjective representations of reality. But there are pervasive differences 
between the two theories' treatment of reality and representation. As MacKinnon says, "femi-
nism turns marxism inside out and on its head." MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and 
the State: An Agenda/or Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CuLTURE & SOCY. 515, 544 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as MacKinnon, SIGNS I]. More specifically, this is how MacKinnon describes the 
differences between her theory and Marxism: 
As marxist method is dialectical materialism, feminist method is consciousness raising: the 
collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's social experience, as women live 
through it. Marxism and feminism on this level posit a different relation between thought 
and thing, both in terms of the relationship of the analysis itself to the social life it captures 
and in terms of the participation of thought in the social life it analyzes. To the extent that 
materialism is scientific it posits and refers to a reality outside thought which it considers to 
have an objective - that is, truly nonsocially perspectival - content. Consciousness rais-
ing, by contrast, inquires into an intrinsically social situation, into that mixture of thought 
and materiality which is women's sexuality in the most generic sense. 
Id. at 543. Through the theory of praxis, Marxist theory of human behavior incorporates some 
elements of consciousness similar to those discussed by MacKinnon. But unlike MacKinnon, the 
element of consciousness in Marxist theory is inextricable from the underlying social and eco-
nomic conditions that give rise to consciousness. Individual consciousness advances only insofar 
as the general level of social organization dictates. As Marx put it, mankind sets itself only such 
tasks as it can solve. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in THE MARX-
ENGELS READER 5 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1978). Although twentieth century Marxist theorists 
ranging from Georg Lukacs to Jean-Paul Sartre to Antonio Gramsci have sought to infuse the 
theory of praxis with greater significance, no Marxist has abandoned Marx's central focus on 
evolving economic conditions (and the human response they engender) as the primary factor in 
historical change. MacKinnon's desire to elevate the importance of subjective consciousness, 
thought, and expression to a plane level with - or even higher than - socioeconomic arrange-
ments denies this central focus and reveals the roots of her theory in philosophical idealism. See 
note 194 infra. 
190. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 337. 
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of controlling pomography.191 MacKinnon proposes to go beyond 
"liberal" theory. 192 Like every progressive critique, MacKinnon's the-
ory is intended to absorb whatever is worthwhile about its intellectual 
191. See, e.g., id. 325-29, 336-40. The term "liberal" is for MacKinnon more an epithet than 
a concept subject to precise definition. The term is used so loosely it is perhaps best understood 
simply as a surrogate for "the ACLU position." MacKinnon never attempts to distinguish be-
tween the divergent philosophical bases underlying the anti-censorship position taken by the 
ACLU and similar organizations. Libertarians are thus lumped with traditional FDR liberals, 
who are in tum treated in tandem with feminist organizations such as the Feminist Anti-Censor-
ship Taskforce, which opposes the MacKinnon approach. The political biases of the "liberals" 
who have criticized MacKinnon's censorship proposals range from the far right, represented by 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, see American Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 
1985), to the avowedly Marxist, see A. SOBLE, PORNOGRAPHY: MARXISM, FEMINISM, AND THE 
FuruRE OF SEXUALITY (1986). For MacKinnon's purposes, they are all the opposition. 
The inability to distinguish between distinct ideas or propositions is a persistent characteristic 
of MacKinnon's work. This trait is especially noticeable in her explanations of the evolution of 
obscenity law. MacKinnon has written that "[d]ifferences in the law over time - such as the 
liberalization of obscenity doctrine - reflect either changes in which group of men have power 
or shifts in perceptions of the best strategy for maintaining male supremacy •.•• " MacKinnon, 
supra note 149, at 331. She goes so far as to maintain that the goals of all nine members of the 
Court are exactly identical. "What this obscures, because the fought-over are invisible in it, is 
that the fight over a definition of obscenity is a fight among men over the best means to guarantee 
male power as a system." Id. at 333. This radically reductivist view of the Court refuses even to 
acknowledge the existence of conflicting views among the Justices. In fact, it masks the very 
differences that should most concern someone interested in furthering the legal interests of wo-
men. The Justices who best represent the male-dominated economic, political, and social status 
quo are the selfsame Justices who concur with MacKinnon's position on suppressing pornogra-
phy. MacKinnon's bite noire among the present Justices is presumably the person who writes 
most forcefully to oppose the censorship of sexually explicit expression, in other words Justice 
Brennan. Yet it is also Justice Brennan who can be counted upon to articulate most strongly 
constitutional principles justifying the judicial elimination of barriers to the empowerment of 
women. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
MacKinnon's poor judgment regarding the conflicting currents on the Court is also evident in 
her tendentious treatment of individual cases. One of the recurring themes of MacKinnon's 
work is that the modem Court's obscenity decisions are not really intended to regulate pornogra-
phy, but rather are an effort to maintain male supremacy. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 331. 
This view leads MacKinnon to assert that the Court has been willing to recognize exploitation in 
the context of obscenity litigation only when the person exploited is male. Id. at 333 n.38. She 
actually goes so far as to suggest that the Court would have decided New York v. Ferber differ· 
ently if the child pornography at issue in that case had depicted female 12-year-olds instead of 
male 12-year-olds. Id. at 333 n.38 & 334 n.42. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) 
(upholding conviction for the sale of a film depicting two 12-year-old boys masturbating). Anal· 
ysis of this sort strains MacKinnon's credibility to the breaking point. 
Unlike MacKinnon, most observers are unable to avoid the obvious fact that the Justices on 
opposing sides of the debate over the regulation of pornography also have far different views on 
broader questions; for example the nature of power and the role of dissent by those standing 
outside the political mainstream. Ironically, in the end it is MacKinnon who checks in on the 
side of those pursuing "the best means to guarantee male power as a system," since she proposes 
to establish a mechanism by which the pre5ent political and economic power structure can culti· 
vate and enforce certain attitudes among the populace. Only an alchemist of extraordinary ex· 
pertise could transmute a theory that increases the power of the status quo into one that 
challenges the status quo. 
192. I use the term "liberal" here to denote those theories of social organization generated by 
or derived from the works of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. Although this particular defini· 
tion of the term is not specifically discussed by MacKinnon, I think it is fair to assert that the 
particular meaning is subsumed in her all-encompassing and very general usage of the term. See 
note 191 supra. 
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precursors into a new synthesis that also incorporates knowledge, in-
sights, and attitudes that were not available to her intellectual 
predecessors. 
Yet in her attempt to supercede both Lockean liberalism and criti-
ques of that doctrine, MacK.innon produces a theory that is actually 
pre-liberal. Her theory, and indeed her entire view of the world, has 
much more in common with the philosophical perspective that pre-
vailed before the Enlightenment. In contrast with the emphasis that 
post-Enlightenment political theory places on temporality and change, 
MacK.innon produces a theory that revolves around a few preordained 
certainties. Her political conclusions follow deductively from un-
changing original premises. She replaces dynamism with stasis. She 
describes the world in absolute terms, with no gray areas and no possi-
bility of mistake. She sees objectivity as a characteristically male per-
spective, and so replaces it with a radically subjective attitude.193 But 
the radical subjectivity she proposes does not concern itself with exter-
nal factors; it is predetermined, unchanging, and unchallengeable.194 
It also lacks the elements of existential freedom and mutability that 
usually characterize such theories. It is, in essence, a religious point of 
view, a view of perfectability and utopia.19s 
This religious aspect of MacK.innon's thought explains why she is 
193. See MacKinnon, SIGNS I, supra note 189, at 535-36; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SocY. 
635, 638-39, 644-45 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, SIGNS II]. 
194. It also has all the basic components of philosophical idealism, although MacKinnon 
denies this. "It [MacKinnon's theory] is neither materialist nor idealist; it is feminist." MacKin-
non, SIGNS II, supra note 193, at 639. This is equivalent to the assertion that a particular sub-
stance under discussion is neither liquid nor solid; it is a turnip. MacKinnon criticizes the work 
of another feminist as idealist in nature because it asserts that "the subordination of women is an 
idea such that to think differently is to change it ••.. " Id. at 639 n.8. Yet this is a pretty good 
precis ofMacKinnon's own theory. ''Where liberal feminism sees sexism primarily as an illusion 
or myth to be dispelled, an inaccuracy to be corrected, true feminism sees the male point of view 
as fundamental to the male power to create the world in its own image, the image of its desires, 
not just as its delusory end product." Id. at 640. If anything, according to MacKinnon the 
problem with liberal feminism is that it is not sufficiently idealist. MacKinnon does not dispute 
the primacy of the idea over the physical world; rather she views the idea as "fundamental" to 
the creation and exercise of power over physical circumstances. However much MacKinnon 
may deny it, this is archetypal idealism. 
195. This accounts for MacKinnon's attack on concepts of objectivity and causation, supra 
note 180, as well as her absolutist moral tone. See W. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE (1936). 
[I]n the metaphysical and religious sphere, articulate reasons are cogent for us only when 
our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclu-
sion. • • • Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original body of truth, and our 
articulately verbalized philosophy is but its showy translation into formulas. The unrea-
soned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument is but a 
surface exhibition. Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow. If a person feels the presence 
of a living God •.. your critical arguments, be they never so superior, will vainly set them-
selves to change his faith. 
Id. at 73-74. 
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uncomfortable with Marx (though less so with Marx's more sentimen-
tal progeny).196 Marx had little patience with theories of morality or 
moral critiques of history. Marx viewed history as decidedly amoral, 
which led him to conclude that the moral concerns of individuals op-
erating within history are supremely irrelevant.197 MacKinnon, on 
the other hand, is concerned almost exclusively with her moral vision. 
Thought, rather than action, is her main concern because "thought 
and thing are inextricable."198 In the context of such a theory the 
morality principle is not merely one facet of a more diverse agenda (as 
it is with the conservative censors); in the MacKinnon system the en-
forcement of the morality principle is the agenda. 
Although the feminist and conservative censors both rely on the 
morality principle to justify their treatment of sexually explicit expres-
sion, the feminist position is ultimately far more misguided than that 
of its conservative counterpart. The conservative censors are at least 
politically consistent; given the presently existing conditions, it is 
probable that enforcement of the morality principle will lead to a soci-
ety largely to their liking. The same cannot be said of the feminist 
censors. Their support for the censorship of pornography is likely to 
lead to the further reinforcement of almost all the values they profess a 
desire to change. Feminist censors such as MacKinnon give courts the 
explicit authority to define ideological values. 199 Such authority 
presents no problem for conservative censors, since they presumably 
can expect to incorporate large portions of their social theory into law. 
The feminist censors, however, are faced with the insurmountable di-
lemma presented by judicial demographics. The judiciary is an over-
whelmingly male enclave. Moreover, the mores of judges are not 
likely to be very hospitable to the feminist critique of society in gen-
eral. Quite the contrary, permitting greater censorship of pornogra-
phy reinforces paternalistic attitudes that have only recently been 
identified as constitutionally suspect in the equal protection area. 200 
196. See MacKinnon, SIGNS I, supra note 193, at 527 n.23. 
197. Such concerns are irrelevant not in that they do not matter, but because they cannot be 
disjoined from the material conditions that create them - i.e., the system of economic relations. 
198. MacKinnon, SIGNS I, supra note 193, at 543. 
199. This is illustrated by MacKinnon's civil rights statute, which provides courts broad 
discretion to determine civil actions based upon the ad hoc definition of broad, value-laden terms 
such as "dehumanization" and "degradation." See note 172 supra. 
200. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (unconstitutional to assume widow, but 
not widower, dependent on deceased spouse for purpose of Social Security survivor's benefits); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sale of 3.2% beer to females, but not males, ages 18-20, 
discrimination violating Equal Protection Clause); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 
(1975) (unconstitutional for Social Security to provide female wage earners less protection for 
survivors, than male wage earners). 
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The notion that women must be protected from visual or aural repre-
sentations of male sexual dominance ironically allows the (usually 
male) judge to play the far more insidious role of father-figure, protect-
ing his weak charge from the hostile environment of the outside world. 
The institutionalization of the concept of judge-as-father-figure (and 
woman-as-victim) may be profoundly harmful to women seeking to 
obtain from the courts protection of equal opportunities historically 
denied on the basis of the male notion that women cannot withstand 
the pressure of the workaday world. 
Permitting courts to serve an explicitly ideological function in the 
course of suppressing pornography also would have a more immediate 
effect on the feminist cause. Feminism is justly concerned with pro-
tecting female sexuality from inordinate pressures exerted by a sexist 
society that views women from its own missionary-position perspec-
tive. However, by making common cause with those who would out-
law pornography in order to preserve "traditional values" or some 
analog thereof, feminist censors are providing support for the further 
entrenchment of the same social institutions, arrangements, and mores 
that created the atmosphere in which pornography proliferates. 
The pornographic perspective to which feminists object is the per-
spective of the unreconstructed heterosexual male, who defines soci-
ety's sexual mores in light of his own limited point of view and 
absolutely proscribes any deviation from his rigid moral standards. As 
indicated in Part I above, the morality principle allows courts to turn 
such perspectives into legal fact. By relying so strongly upon the con-
stitutive powers of ideas - and demanding the right to regulate such 
ideas through law - MacKinnon implicitly approves the very mecha-
nism that has regularly been used against the interests of women (and 
all political outsiders) in the past. The framework of absolute moral 
certainty employed by the present status quo is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from that articulated by feminist censors such as MacKinnon. 
All such systems express a need to identify and eliminate the expres-
sion of deviant tendencies. 201 The enforcers of morality will always 
find some expression that "disgust[s] and sicken[s]."202 The problem 
with systems based on the morality principle is that they can never 
justify judicial disgust on grounds that do not relate to the tenets of the 
judge's (or the dominant community's) own moral scheme. The sys-
tem is circular, and its conclusions are self-justifying. MacKinnon is 
201. This trait is clearly evident in the existing case law. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 
2841 (1986); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
202. Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 508. 
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therefore wrong to distinguish between morality and power:203 the 
two concepts cannot be segregated. The true question is that of power 
over morality. From that basic issue, as I will argue in the next sec-
tion, all things relevant to the first amendment follow. 
IV. THE CASE FOR ABANDONING THE MORALITY PRINCIPLE IN 
FIRST AMENDMENT LITIGATION 
The previous sections of this article are devoted to examining the 
pervasive but often unstated reliance on the morality principle by 
those seeking to regulate sexually explicit expression. My own un-
stated (but surely perceptible) bias is that reliance on this principle is 
unjustified. This section is intended to give substance to, and, it is 
hoped, will fully justify, that bias. 
My position is based on two primary tenets, one theoretical and 
one practical in nature. The theoretical tenet is that the first amend-
ment should be deemed to incorporate an epistemological stance of 
radical skepticism, which by definition vitiates the morality princi-
ple. 204 The practical implication of this theory is that pornography 
cannot be regulated without substantially diminishing the theoretical 
appeal of arguments advocating the protection of other forms of ex-
pression.205 The latter proposition is not at all originat.206 However, 
the proponents of this position seem to have lost control of the ongo-
ing debate over the regulation of pornography. Their response to the 
advocates of suppression thus has been largely defensive in nature.207 
They have come to be concerned primarily with protecting a body of 
precedent that, as the analysis above indicates,208 was not inherently 
hospitable to the anti-censorship position to begin with. 
It is necessary, therefore, to reexamine and recast first amendment 
theory as it applies to sexually explicit expression. The first step in 
such a reexamination is to dispense with the framework established by 
censorship advocates. The efforts by the advocates of censorship to 
establish artificial categories of expression and then to use those cate-
203. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 323. 
204. See notes 249-63 infra and accompanying text. 
205. See notes 264-81 infra and accompanying text. 
206. For example, this proposition was one aspect of the Black/Douglas "absolutist" posi-
tion, and has likewise long been a mainstay of the civil liberties tradition represented by advo-
cates such as Thomas Emerson. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
495-503 (1970). 
207. See, e.g., Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission: New 
Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 27 (1986); Emerson, 
Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3 YALE L. & POLY. 
REV. 130 (1984). 
208. See notes 19-76 supra and accompanying text. 
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gories to justify suppression must be viewed as tactical evasions that 
are intended to shift the focus away from the real point of the debate. 
The battle to suppress pornography is not, finally, about sex; it is 
about deviance. The efforts to control pornography are equally efforts 
to stake out an area of impermissible thought, a sort of intellectual no-
man's-land, which by its very existence delegitimizes everything that 
crops up within the forbidden territory. Unfortunately, expression can 
never be so clearly defined. Expression - even pornographic expres-
sion - carries multiple messages. From the perspective of the first 
amendment, pornography's implicit endorsement of social deviance 
and moral nonconformity should be just as important as the more ex-
plicit references to sexual activity. If the mechanisms proposed by the 
censorship advocates are adopted, the facial message of pornography 
becomes the sole concern, and censorship becomes a self-fulfilling 
proposition. 
A. The Tolerance Model of First Amendment Adjudication 
From a theoretical standpoint, the drive to suppress pornography 
is flawed in one key respect: it permits the state to certify a realm of 
moral certainty in the face of a constitutional structure that denies the 
state that very power. This point can be clarified by viewing it in the 
context of several recent proposals arguing that a tolerance model, 
rather than a skepticism model, should govern constitutional the-
ory. 209 Although there are significant differences among the various 
proponents of a tolerance rationale, they are joined in asserting some 
variation on the theme that "even if governmental infallibility is as-
sumed, the expression of false beliefs should nevertheless be toler-
ated. "210 The support offered for such a toleration model varies 
widely. David Richards, for example, relies on the premises of tradi-
tional Lockean individualism and moral autonomy, described by 
Richards as "the inalienable right to conscience."211 Steven Smith 
couples another version of the Lockean argument with a more practi-
cal rationale for the tolerance principle. According to Smith, toler-
ance simply provides the most commonsensical and coherent 
explanation for rules favoring broad protections for speech.212 Lee 
Bollinger and Suzanna Sherry advocate a regime of tolerance in order 
209. See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST 
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CoNSTITUTION (1986); 
Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 
649 (1987); Sherry, An Essay Concerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L. REv. 963 (1987). 
210. Smith, supra note 209, at 700. 
211. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 209, at 68. 
212. Smith, supra note 209. 
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to advance a particular form of civic virtue. In their view, the state 
must practice tolerance in order to inculcate tolerant attitudes among 
its citizens.213 
All four examples of the tolerance rationale are compatible with 
the morality principle. This follows from the very nature of the con-
cept of tolerance. By definition, the theory of "tolerance" has meaning 
only if it permits the continued existence of something the governing 
agent finds unpalatable. Thus, Professor Smith recognizes, "tolerance 
is compatible with subjective certainty regarding one's own beliefs, or 
even with outright prejudice."214 In other words, there must be a 
baseline from which to determine what must be tolerated. Among 
other things, that baseline consists of a particular ethical scheme em-
bodied in the morality principle. As with the morality principle itself, 
the tolerance rationale is consistent with both narrow and fairly broad 
conceptions of the general scope of first amendment protection.215 
However, it will not ultimately support the strong pro-speech position 
taken by each of my four tolerance rationale examples. 
As noted above, all tolerance models are based on some form of 
moral certainty. The moral certainty is embodied in a set of principles 
that define the status quo, referred to above as the "baseline" from 
which the level of tolerance is to be determined. Tolerance theorists 
are therefore wholly opposed to skepticism and/or moral relativism as 
the conceptual basis for the first amendment protections of expres-
sion. 216 The tolerance rationale is integrated into the status quo in 
order to bolster and protect some or all aspects of the status quo. 
This can be illustrated by considering the tolerance rationale (and 
the first amendment itself) in the context of the larger political organ-
213. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 209, at 237-48; Sherry, supra note 209, at 983-89. 
214. Smith, supra note 209, at 700 n.155. 
215. Even Robert Bork's extremely limited interpretation of the first amendment is based on 
the assumptions of the tolerance model. See Bork, supra note 85. The only distinguishing char-
acteristic is that Bork does not believe that the state may be forced to tolerate any but the most 
rudimentary forms of political expression. Bork's work provides a good example of the primary 
theoretical flaw in the tolerance model. Bork explicitly recognizes what the latter-day tolerance 
theorists acknowledge only obliquely, that the existence of the state in its present form is the sine 
qua non of all tolerance model first amenqment theory. Therefore, protection of expression must 
rely in the final analysis on the willingness of the existing regime to defer to its opponents. See 
notes 216-17 infra and accompanying text. 
216. A primary purpose of the Smith article is to rebut both "strong" and "weak" skepticism 
rationales for first amendment protection. See Smith, supra note 209, at 663-99. Sherry links 
moral relativism with liberal legal theory, to which she is opposed. Sherry, supra note 209, at 
971. Bollinger's book contains a sensitive, but ultimately disapproving review of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes's skepticism. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 209, at 158-74. Richards is, at least on the 
surface, more congenial to skepticism arguments. But Richards's good intentions cannot over-
come his reliance upon Lockean liberalism, whose theoretical underpinnings justify suppression 
of skeptical thought directed at the political status quo. See note 247 infra. 
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ism of which it is a part. In all of its variants, tolerance is recognized 
as one value among many to be adopted and enforced by the state's 
legal apparatus. The state, which has the power to declare its alle-
giance to a disparate group of precepts and principles, can always de-
cide to elevate the importance of some values and devalue others. 
Tolerance, in other words, can always be subordinated to other goals. 
It is true that the tolerance theorists insist this will never happen, since 
they declare that the tolerance rationale is first among equals. But by 
ascribing to the existing political structure the power to certify social 
values (including, but not limited to, tolerance), this theory undercuts 
the logic by which th~ state's power over expression may be limited. 
A first amendment theory based on a notion of radical skepticism en-
courages the populace to cast a doubtful eye on everything, including 
the present composition of the state itself. In contrast, the political 
infrastructure that embodies and enforces the value of tolerance neces-
sarily assumes its own continued existence. No variation of tolerance 
is so extreme as to tolerate its own demise. Thus, when the structure 
that originally endorsed tolerance is itself threatened, the tolerance 
theory falls away and the needs of survival (Le., governmental sur-
vival) become supreme. The tolerance rationale is self-limiting and 
therefore cannot provide the theoretical basis for strong protection of 
expression. 
1. Communitarian Tolerance 
It is significant that the tolerance rationale is frequently considered 
in the context of extreme political speech, because this provides the 
tolerance theorists the opportunity to articulate the practical limita-
tions of their theory. Bollinger, for example, generally supports the 
basic scope of present law regarding free expression. Thus, he seems 
to endorse the incitement test that the modem Court has adopted 
from Learned Hand.217 Under this standard, extreme political speech 
is protected until such time as it incites harmful conduct, of which the 
forceful overthrow of the government is a prime example. Bollinger 
does not apply his version of the tolerance rationale to limit other 
forms of speech, but the tolerance rationale he proposes does contain 
the seed of further limitations. 
Professor Sherry provides one example of the form those limita-
217. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 209, at 194-200. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969) (violation of first and fourteenth amendments to impose criminal sanction for 
mere advocation of illegal action); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), revd., 
246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) (upholding Postmaster General's determination under Espionage Act 
that magazine nonmailable because it willfully obstructs recruitment into military service by 
publication of certain cartoons). 
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tions might take. Sherry, whose theory is presented as "variations on 
[Bollinger's] theme,"218 takes the tolerance rationale one step further 
than the theory's progenitor. Tolerance, she notes, is merely one as-
pect of a larger social ethos.219 The role of the state, she asserts, is to 
cultivate that ethos.220 Sherry "envisions a more active role for gov-
ernment" than the liberal "rights model" of first amendment jurispru-
dence that presently dominates both the courts and law schools.221 
The "activist" role she proposes is largely educational in nature. 
However, in pursuing its educational role, the state must often choose 
between the virtues it is trying to cultivate among its citizens. There 
are, therefore, inherent limits on what the state must tolerate. 
Sherry is hesitant to press these limits very far, and indeed she does 
not specifically permit the state to outlaw any presently permitted 
forms of speech. But she does allow the state to take an active role in 
discouraging speech with which the dominant political forces disagree. 
She uses pornography as an example. Although the state may not pro-
scribe this form of expression~ she contends, the government is per-
fectly free to identify pornographic speech as abhorrent. The 
government is evidently free to use any means at its disposal short of 
absolute prohibition in order to cultivate a disapproving attitude to-
ward pornography among its citizens.222 In other words, the govern-
ment may simultaneously exercise tolerance and intolerance. 
Paradoxically, there seems to be an intolerance exception to the toler-
ance rationale. "[T]here is no reason for the government to remain 
neutral; it need only permit the speech, not condone it through 
silence. "223 
The most obvious flaw in this argument is its inability to justify 
any limitation on the exercise of state regulatory power over expres-
sion. If government may base legislation on non-neutral grounds (i.e., 
on something akin to the morality principle), why may it not use all 
the power within its means to enforce that legislation? Sherry's an-
swer would seem to be that the government may not use all its en-
forcement power because to do so would foster intolerant attitudes. 
But if the government may seek to "educate" its population by engag-
ing in "principled defenses of the reasons for intolerance,"224 Sherry 
218. Sherry, supra note 209, at 989. 
219. Id. at 984. 
220. Id. at 985. 
221. Id. at 989. 
222. Id. at 988. 
223. Id. at 988-89. 
224. Id. at 988. 
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has already acknowledged that the government is allowed to 
subordinate the virtue of tolerance to other virtues the state deems 
preferable. If this educational campaign is conducted properly, the 
targets of the campaign (the citizens) could logically question the con-
sistency of their rulers, who simultaneously tolerate something and as-
sert that it should not be tolerated. 
Sherry's system of tolerable intolerance is also difficult to apply. It 
is unclear how Sherry would distinguish between impermissible gov-
ernmental sanctions and permissible governmental disapproval. She 
never identifies the exact level of governmental action that would be 
sufficient to constitute impermissible governmental sanctions. Her ex-
amples all imply that the tolerance rationale prohibits only absolute 
proscription of the offending material. 225 However, she also mentions 
the dispute that arose when the Pornography Commission allegedly 
pressured corporations that operated retail magazine outlets to cease 
the sale of Playboy and Penthouse in their stores. 226 Although a fed-
eral district court enjoined the Commission from following through on 
its threat to publish the names of stores that continued to sell the 
magazines, the stores removed the magazines anyway.227 
Sherry implies that the identification of offending corporations by 
the Pornography Commission would have been an impermissible gov-
ernmental sanction under her version of the tolerance rationale. She 
suggests that the fact that the stores removed the magazines after the 
injunction issued reflects a "change in attitude" on the part of the cor-
porations, rather than a response to governmental pressure. 228 If in 
fact the mere mention of governmental disapproval in a commission 
report is sufficient to constitute impermissible governmental sanction, 
then Sherry's theory is indeed fairly limited, and does not pose a great 
threat to free speech. However, such a limited construction of "sanc-
tion'' also seems inconsistent with Sherry's insistence that the govern-
ment not be forced to "condone [speech] through silence."229 In fact, 
action such as that threatened by the Pornography Commission seems 
to be precisely what Sherry has in mind as a proper governmental re-
action to unsavory expression. A government agency - the Pornog-
raphy Commission - did nothing more than identify expression that 
the government did not want to condone. 
225. See id. at 987-89. 
226. See id. at 988 n.115. See also Playboy Enters. v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 
1986). 
227. 639 F. Supp. at 588. 
228. Sherry, supra note 209, at 988 n.115. 
229. Id. at 989. 
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If, as I suggest, the action of the Pornography Commission is in-
deed compatible with Sherry's tolerance rationale, then her theory is 
actually quite radical, for it allows the government to engage in a form 
of subtle official blackmail. As the Playboy case indicates, governmen-
tal pressure of this sort is an effective limit on expression, even when 
countered with a quick and hostile judicial reaction. 23° Furthermore, 
if official action of this kind may be based on little more than a major-
ity decision to advocate one set of moral principles over another, then 
the intolerance exception begins to swallow the tolerance rationale. It 
also provides a justification for the application of the morality princi-
ple that is almost as broad as those considered in the preceding 
sections. 
2. Individualist Tolerance 
Unlike the communitarian orientation of Bollinger and Sherry, 
which envisions an activist state with a mandate to cultivate certain 
virtues in its citizens, Richards and Smith exhibit a more traditional 
reliance on individualism and limited government to justify their ver-
sion of the tolerance rationale. This version of the tolerance rationale 
is intended to protect the interests of morally autonomous individu-
als. 231 Richards and Smith acknowledge their heavy debt to John 
Locke.232 I have criticized elsewhere the notion that Lockean individ-
ualism should continue to serve as the philosophical basis for modem 
constitutional interpretation.233 It is not necessary to repeat those 
criticisms here, for the limitations inherent in the individualist version 
of the tolerance rationale are evident in Professor Smith's own detailed 
application of that theory. 
The lodestar of Professor Smith's theory of tolerance is the notion 
that truth can be definitively determined and used as the basis of social 
policy. Smith concurs with Locke's belief in the "potential certainty 
of 1!1-oral knowledge."234 However, as Smith acknowledges, at first 
230. I therefore disagree with Sherry's contention that the removal of magazines by the cor-
porations originally identified by the Pornography Commission represented a "change in atti· 
tude" on the part of the companies that was unrelated to the threatened governmental action. As 
Sherry herself recognized, the initial threat was widely publicized and immediately had the in· 
tended effect of forcing the removal of the magazines. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, at A6, col. 
I. The companies involved quite naturally were disinclined to reverse their decision on the 
magazines once the injunction issued, since a decision of that nature would have drawn further 
attention to them and perhaps instigated private action of the sort the Commission later en-
dorsed. PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 419-29 (recommending private pro-
tests, boycotts, and related activities at stores selling offending material). 
231. See generally D. RICHARDS, supra note 209, at 67-102; Smith, supra note 209, at 703-07. 
232. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 209, at 89-102; Smith, supra note 209, at 701-07. 
233. See Gey, supra note 113, at 624-32. 
234. Smith, supra note 209, at 702. 
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glance the notion of moral certainty provides a logical rationale for 
intolerance rather than tolerance.235 After all, if one can know the 
truth, what point is there in allowing falsehood to survive? Smith an-
swers this dilemma by divining two aspects of communication in every 
instance of expression. The first aspect is the "propositional" compo-
nent of expression.236 In this first sense, "the world is fiat" may be 
described as false. The second aspect of communication, however, is 
the "biographical" component of expression. In the second sense, 
therefore, "the world is fiat" may be true if it accurately reflects the 
pre-Columbian views of the speaker. Smith thus claims to have sur-
mounted the obstacle that his moral certainty poses, because even 
propositionally false statements may have some first amendment value 
if they are biographically true. 237 
There are two fatal flaws in this analysis. The first is a conse-
quence of Smith's refusal to distinguish between moral and political 
certainty and factual certainty.238 When Smith claims the capability 
to ascertain the propositional certainty of the statement "the world is 
fiat," one is tempted to give him the benefit of the doubt. But it is a 
fundamentally different affair when Smith goes on to claim that state-
ments such as " 'Slavery is evil,' 'Honesty is good,' or 'Chastity is a 
virtue,' " are "descriptive and objective,'' and therefore "capable of 
being and, at least in principle, of being known to be, true or false."239 
The meaning of "truth" itself is subtly altered when Smith moves from 
the area of scientific verifiability to moral certainty. The definition of 
truth in the area of politics or morality is "deliberately a loose one," 
and, in effect, renders as "objective truth" anything that corresponds 
to present political and ethical arrangements. 240 The moral certainty 
that informs Smith's tolerance rationale is therefore revealed as a form 
of epistemological hubris, which assumes that the world as we know it 
has reached the apogee of moral and political knowledge.241 
235. Id. at 657. 
236. Id. at 712. 
237. Id. at 713-15. 
238. See id. at 679. 
239. Id. at 680. 
240. See id. at 659 n.33: "The criteria for accepting 'an idea or proposition might be framed 
in terms of the idea's 'correspondence' with an external reality, the idea's 'coherence' with other 
propositions, facts, or ideas believed to be true, or perhaps even in terms of the objectively deter-
minable, pragmatic value of the idea." In other words, one belief can serve as the basis for a 
second, which in tum can justify a third. "Pragmatic value" then comes into play in order to 
assess the best means available to achieve a subjectively determined end. The system is closed 
and impregnable. 
241. Theories based on skepticism are faulty, Smith asserts, because they are incapable of 
recognizing the exalted state of current knowledge. "The democracy theory of free expression 
seems most cogent ... when it assumes the existence of knowable political truths and contends 
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This hubris would be harmless if it could not be enforced on those 
possessing a more skeptical nature. But, as noted above, tolerance the-
ory breaks down once it accepts that the state can identify and protect 
a set of essential moral verities. It is inevitable that a state in that 
situation will abandon the tolerance theory when its moral essence is 
threatened. Smith seeks to avoid this result with his bifurcated pro-
positional/biographical theory of expression. He contends that the 
state will tolerate propositionally untrue statements in order to protect 
the biographically true component of such statements.242 However, 
this conclusion simply does not follow from Smith's strong belief in 
moral certainty. For example, Smith seems to consider revolutionary 
Marxism the political equivalent of the factual assertion "the world is 
fiat." Although Smith recognizes that the subject of fundamental 
political change is indeed significant, he also notes that one could con-
clude that "the [endorsement of revolution] itself is simply wrong, and 
thus without substantial value."243 Smith nevertheless contends that 
the state should permit the expression of these political inaccuracies in 
order to protect the biographical truth they reveal about those individ-
uals who believe in Marxism.214 
But if moral and political · ideas can be definitively identified as 
false, the biographical truth such falsehoods reflect seems to be a thin 
reed on which to build a system protecting free speech. This is espe-
cially true if "false" ideas are perceived as threatening the structure 
that protects "true" political ideas. This can be demonstrated by ap-
plying the same logic to inaccuracies of fact. For example, although 
"the world is fiat" is generally a harmless statement, no one would 
expect a naval academy to allow its navigation instructors to base their 
lectures on such an idea. It would threaten serious damage to the 
preservation of truths necessary to the continued existence of the insti-
tution. Likewise, if revolutionary Marxism is an equally "false" idea, 
the state should not be expected to allow the idea to be propagated by 
anyone with influence. A poor and puny anonymity may be allowed 
to preach it on the street corner, but an economics or history professor 
advocating such theories should be arrested (or at least fired) post-
haste. Likewise, if "chastity is a virtue" is determined to be a verifia-
ble moral truth, then Lady Chatterley's Lover is once again in great 
that a democratic government is best able to apprehend and act upon such truths. Skepticism 
does not strengthen, but rather weakens the democratic rationale for freedom of expression." Id. 
at 675 (footnotes omitted). 
242. Id. at 723-29. 
243. Id. at 729. 
244. Id. 
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danger.245 
The intolerant nature of the tolerance theory should be evident to 
anyone familiar with Smith's hero John Locke. As Smith himself rec-
ognizes, Locke's tolerance wore thin when he confronted ideas that 
truly offended his own moral and political sensibilities.246 Thus, Lock-
ean tolerance did not extend to Catholics, Moslems, or atheists.247 
Smith's development of the tolerance theory is no less selective than is 
Locke's, but it is a great deal less coherent. Locke at least operated 
within the framework of a stable moral universe. Locke could ad-
vance a theory based on moral certainty because he assumed the exist-
ence of an unquestioned external reference point - God - by which 
all earthly matters could be judged. Smith, bereft of Locke's religious 
lodestar, is precluded from basing his assertion of moral truth on any-
thing beyond "human belief in truth."248 Smith's moral certainty 
therefore amounts to an ethical tautology, and the tolerance rationale 
he derives from it is merely a clOak to conceal the circularity of the 
system. 
245. See Kingsley Intl. Pictures, Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
246. See Smith, note 209 supra, at 701 n.157. Although Smith recognizes this inconsistency, 
he does not attempt to explain or critique it. 
247. See J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE SECOND TREATISE OF ClvIL 
GOVERNMENT AND A LETIER CoNCERNING TOLERATION 155-56 (J. Gough ed. 1947) (1st ed. 
1689). While Smith merely ignores Locke's intolerance, Richards's more philosophical discus-
sion attempts to explain it away. Richards views Locke's advocacy of intolerance toward, for 
example, atheism as an aspect of "moral-sense theory" rather than theological protectionism. 
Richards views Lockean tolerance as intended to protect the moral autonomy of individuals, and 
"[f]or Locke, ethical experience, as such, depended on the concept of an omnipotent and ethical 
creator God." D. RICHARDS, supra note 209, at 107 n.15. Thus, in Locke's day, protecting the 
moral autonomy of individuals did not require protection for the amorality of atheists. Today, 
however, "[c]ontemporary moral theory ... analyzes ethical reasoning independently of religious 
reasoning or belief in an afterlife." Id. at 125. Therefore, the sectarian limitations Locke placed 
on tolerance are no longer necessary. 
Although Richards makes a noble attempt to salvage a form of Lockean tolerance that will be 
acceptable in our secular age, that effort must be regarded as a failure. Locke's own stated 
reasons for excluding certain groups from the ambit of his theory were, after all, decidedly less 
abstract than those emphasized by Richards. The Moslem and Catholic faiths were excluded not 
because their adherents were incapable of developing a systematic moral framework, but rather 
because they were inherently treasonous. These faiths cast doubt on the moral authority of the 
state, and therefore could not be tolerated. See id. at 95-96; J. LocKE, supra. See also C. HILL, 
MILTON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 155-57 (1977) (discussing the related tolerance theo-
ries of John Milton, who considered Catholicism " 'a priestly despotism under the cloak of reli-
gion,' which 'extirpates all religious and civil supremacies' "). Atheism was excluded from 
Locke's tolerance theory not because it was amoral, but because "it undermined the sanctity of 
promises." Smith, supra note 209, at 701 n.157. This, in turn, endangered the contractual rela-
tions necessary to sustain the economic structure of incipient capitalism, which was the driving 
force behind Locke's theory. See c. MACPHERSON, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE 
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LoCKE (1962). In other words, Locke's philosophical justification 
was intertwined with, and limited by, the political and economic context in which it was devel-
oped. Like all tolerance theories, Lockean tolerance tolerates only that which does not truly 
threaten the existing order. 
248. Smith, supra note 209, at 704 (emphasis omitted). 
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B. The Skepticism Model of First Amendment Adjudication 
The tolerance model and the morality principle are both unaccept-
able under the first amendment because they are based on an outmo-
ded notion of moral and political certainty. This notion embodies a 
pre-Enlightenment view of humankind. It proposes that we are at the 
center of a simple and ordered universe, whose mysteries can be 
known and understood. This is an inappropriate and ultimately 
counterproductive model for first amendment jurisprudence. It exalts 
the status quo. What is inevitably becomes what should be. The first 
amendment ceases to function as a mechanism intended to foster natu-
ral political evolution, and becomes instead another prop for the ex-
isting political and social order. 
The first amendment can be rescued from this reactionary role 
only if tolerance models of interpretation are replaced with a theoreti-
cal framework characterized by radical skepticism. What I call "radi-
cal" skepticism is equivalent in most respects to what Professor Smith 
terms "strong" skepticism. Smith is extremely critical of this intellec-
tual stance, which "professes deeper doubts - sometimes amounting 
to complete despair - about the possibility of human knowledge."249 
Despite the seemingly unattractive traits of this theory, Smith ac-
knowledges that "strong" skepticism is a familiar phenomenon in first 
amendment jurisprudence, for it is in all key respects the position 
taken in the later free speech opinions of Justice Holmes. 250 
But contrary to Smith's view, this position is neither despairing 
nor intellectually insupportable. It is not despairing merely to recog-
nize that political change is inevitable, and that we do not necessarily 
live in the best of all possible worlds. Nor is it intellectually indefen-
sible to assert that moral and political skepticism should not be treated 
identically with other forms of skepticism.251 The skepticism that is 
the subject of the following discussion is not contradicted by the exist-
ence of reliable and consistent empirical judgments about the physical 
world. The radical skepticism discussed below asserts simply that ab-
solute political knowledge is unknowable because those seeking such 
knowledge are self-interested and therefore incapable of making objec-
tive judgments. Treatment of other forms of philosophical skepticism 
is both beyond the scope of this article and unnecessary for the conclu-
sions that follow. With that distinction in mind, the contours of the 
249. Smith, supra note 209, at 664 (footnote omitted). 
250. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
251. See notes 23841 supra and accompanying text. 
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argument for radical skepticism can be clarified by way of rebutting 
Smith's criticisms of the skeptical approach. 
The starting point of Smith's analysis is his belief that skepticism is 
logically insupportable. In the course of critiquing the skepticism the-
ories of C. Edwin Baker,252 Smith reduces the skepticism argument to 
its most basic form. Baker argues at one point that truth does not 
exist, but is chosen.253 This argument, says Smith, "collapses upon 
itself. The contention that beliefs are chosen, and thus not objectively 
true, must itself be seen as chosen and thus not objectively true."254 
Baker would not propose his theory, Smith notes, unless Baker 
thought it had some value. "[Baker] assumes, in other words, that his 
argument that 'truth is not objective' is true in some objective sense. 
Thus, if Baker is right, then Baker is wrong."255 Smith has discovered 
a frailty in one particular presentation of skepticism, but not in the 
theory itself. The problem can be corrected simply by casting the the-
ory in the affirmative. The theory of skepticism asserts that all state-
ments of truth are hypothetical and transitory. That is not to say that 
one can never find reasons for adopting one theory and rejecting an-
other, but rather that all theories are susceptible to constant modifica-
tion and periodic rejection. This statement of the position refutes 
Smith's allegation of self-contradiction. After all, I may be wrong. 
Tolerance theories of first amendment interpretation are all char-
acterized by persistent optimism concerning the possibility of moral 
knowledge, coupled with a fear of the wages of uncertainty. Skepti-
cism rejects definitive assertions of morality and accepts political and 
ethical uncertainty as an inevitable consequence of historical develop-
ment. The tolerance proponents' Panglossian bent leads them to inter-
pret history as a cul-de-sac. Once the historical destination is reached, 
one cannot proceed any further. Political mutation continues only un-
til it hits its natural end point. Skepticism, on the other hand, views 
all life as a constantly evolving series of experiments. It is, in the 
purely scientific sense, Darwinian.256 
Smith, who in this respect is the consummate tolerance theorist, 
views political history just as he views scientific history. The fact that 
fighting faiths have been overturned with regularity since human life 
began does not cause Smith to question his optimism. "[I]t is not 
252. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 
(1978). 
253. See id. at 975. 
254. Smith, supra note 209, at 671. 
255. Id. 
256. See id. at 668. 
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merely their lack of present acceptance that justifies the conclusion 
that erstwhile faiths are false. Rather, it is the fact that we have now 
discovered more reliable methods of ascertaining truth - the scientific 
method, for instance - and that such methods have disconfirmed for-
mer beliefs."2s1 But in fact, to amend Holmes only slightly, the life of 
politics (and thus the law) has not been logic, it has been power.258 
The present arrangements seem fairly benign to those of us in the so-
cial strata that contributes to the law reviews, but we should not con-
fuse our own satisfaction with everlasting truth. 
The presumptuous parochialism evident in Smith's contention that 
we (that is, late twentieth-century middle-class Americans) have now 
"discovered more reliable methods of ascertaining [political] truth" in-
dicates another fundamental difference between the tolerant and the 
skeptical world views. Tolerance theory treats the state as if it is a 
direct manifestation of perfected human knowledge. Furthermore, the 
tolerance model treats the state as a creation of individuals fully capa-
ble of identifying and realizing their interests by freely engaging in 
collective action. In other words, individuals create history, history 
does not create individuals. Skepticism proposes that just the opposite 
is true. The collective precedes the individual, according to the skepti-
cism model, and thus the individual is always defined by and subject to 
the historical circumstances into which he or she is born. This is per-
haps the single most important distinction between the tolerance and 
skepticism models of the first amendment. 
The emphasis placed by the skepticism model on collective entities, 
rather than individuals, explains the theory's deep suspicion of state-
endorsed certainty as the basis for regulating expression. Whatever 
the possibility that an individual may obtain certain moral knowledge, 
the skepticism model emphasizes that collective entities will always be 
257. Id. at 666. Smith's faith in the objectivity of the scientific method ignores the human 
biases that are incorporated in that method, and which often dictate the results of scientific 
investigation. One recent study has commented upon the influence of scientific models focusing 
on conditions of "[s]tability, balance, equilibrium, and continuity" and the role these same intel-
lectual models play in perpetuating the political status quo. R. LEVINS & R. LEWONTIN, THE 
DIALECTICAL BIOLOGisr 275 (1985). Moreover, Smith's view of the scientific method as a 
"method of ascertaining truth" subtly misconstrues the nature of the scientific method itself. 
The method (if it is to be helpful at all) does seek to ascertain truth, but it does so ironically by 
seeking to undermine (or, to put it more positively, transcend) the accepted truths of the mo-
ment. Science is the process by which imperfect governing paradigms are constantly superseded 
by new, but equally imperfect, ways of describing reality. Thomas Kuhn likened scientific para· 
digms to ·~udicial decision[s] in the common law ... an object for further articulation and 
specification under new or more stringent conditions." T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OP SCIEN· 
TIPIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (1962). This incessant dialectical process of contradiction and resolution 
is far more compatible with a regime of radical skepticism than with a theory positing the defini· 
tive ascertainment of objective truth. 
258. See 0. HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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driven by an independent and amoral dynamic that is incompatible 
with moral knowledge of any sort. Regulations enforcing state-deter-
mined principles of personal or political morality are intended to sup-
port the primary goal of institutional self-perpetuation, rather than 
protect "true" ideas against the onslaught of the "false." Falsehood of 
this sort can be proved only by comparison to contrary principles es-
tablished in advance. If one stipulates at the outset that true precepts 
are set forth in The Wealth of Nations, then Marxism is therefore un-
true. This may be logical (at least in the sense that logic demands the 
recognition that capitalism is not socialism), but it is hardly a defini-
tive and objective statement of moral truth. 
What Smith describes as the "Darwinian" nature of Justice 
Holmes's skepticism259 reflects Holmes's strong identification with the 
implications of the philosophical materialism I have just described. 
Holmes believed that moral truths are the creation of historical neces-
sity, that constant conflict between competing interests is inevitable, 
and that political change is a given. 260 In this raucous atmosphere, 
free speech is a natural phenomenon. The inclusion of the first amend-
ment in the Constitution should therefore be interpreted in light of the 
ephemeral nature of all human enterprises. No government can pre-
vent the inexorable development of historical forces. If Smith is 
wrong, and the ideas of Marxists turn out to be "true" after all, then 
"the only meaning of free speech is that they be given their chance and 
have their way."261 
The irony of this position is that it posits a strong protection of 
expression not because free expression is one of the most significant 
aspects of political activity and psychological well-being, but rather 
because expression is basically insignificant, a mere shadow of the his-
torical forces that give it content. That is not to say that expression 
has no value whatsoever. If political change is inevitable, then it is 
reasonable to provide an avenue for change to occur peacefully. The 
requirement that expression of radical political ideas be permitted can 
259. Smith, supra note 209, at 668. 
260. I don't believe that it is an absolute principle or even a human ultimate that man 
always is an end in himself - that his dignity must be respected, etc. We march up a 
conscript with bayonets behind to die for a cause he doesn't believe in. And I feel no 
scruples about it. Our morality seems to me only a check on the ultimate domination of 
force, just as our politeness is a check on the impulse of every pig to put his feet in the 
trough. 
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Dr. Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), reprinted in THE MIND AND 
FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 431 (M. Lerner ed. 1943). See Rogat & O'Fallon, Mr. Justice 
Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion - The Speech Case, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1349, 1361-68 (1984); 
Laski, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 40 YALE L.J. 683 (1931). 
261. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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serve this function. As Holmes said, "[e]loquence may set fire to rea-
son."262 Of course, evolutionary change will not always supplant vio-
lent revolution, and no theory of the first amendment will prevent the 
state from acting like a state in the end. We can force the state to 
allow Thoreau to speak on behalf of John Brown, but nothing will 
prevent the state from executing John Brown.263 Nevertheless, the 
possibility of peaceful change is always present, and the first amend-
ment should be interpreted in a way that fosters that possibility. 
In any event, the primary argument skepticism offers in favor of 
protecting free expression is epistemological, not practical. If the 
characterization of the state offered above is correct, then every reason 
the. state offers for suppressing expression can be reduced to a self-
serving argument that the status quo should be perpetuated. The state 
certainly has the means for enforcing its view, but its arguments are 
hardly compelling on their own merits. Marxism is "false" because it 
is contrary to the interests of the present power structure. Sexually 
explicit expression is "bad" because it deviates from the norm defined 
by the existing hierarchy of social relations. The first amendment, if it 
means anything, requires that arguments of this nature be rejected. If 
push comes to shove, the state will prevail anyway, but short of the 
paroxysm of revolution the first amendment should be read as broadly 
as possible. 
C. Skepticism, Social Deviance, and the Regulation 
of Pornography 
The skepticism model presented above undercuts the modem 
Court's obscenity jurisprudence, as well as the va1ious forms of aca-
demic support recently offered for regulating pornography. The mo-
rality principle on which the judicial and academic support for 
suppression is based cannot be squared with a first amendment inter-
preted through the prism of radical skepticism. Under the skepticism 
model, the state may not suppress expression on the basis of the mo-
rality principle because it cannot offer nontendentious justifications for 
this action. Any given political organization represents a range of 
dominant values, all of which are subject to the skepticism critique. 
Because some of these values relate to sexual morality, the regulation 
of pornography cannot be treated differently from the regulation of 
any other form of expression. The moral or aesthetic status quo is no 
more objectively "true" than any other component of the current 
262. 268 U.S. at 673. 
263. See H. THOREAU, A Plea for Captain John Brown, in REFORM PAPERS (W. Glick ed. 
1973) (1st ed. 1860). 
June 1988) Apologetics of Suppression 1627 
political order. Therefore, verbal attacks on any aspect of the status 
quo cannot be suppressed without resorting to the circular argument 
that the status quo should be preserved. 
Furthermore, the process by which the advocates of suppression 
attempt to single out sexually explicit speech for special treatment is 
also vulnerable under the skepticism model. Those advocating the 
suppression of pornography attempt to divide expression into neat 
compartments, preserving strong first amendment protection for ex-
pression fitting into the "political" compartment while limiting (or 
eliminating) first amendment protection for expression in other, 
"nonpolitical" compartments. From this perspective, all expression 
can be reduced to one predominant dimension, which can be defini-
tively ascertained and used to determine the level of protection that 
will be afforded under the first amendment. 
The contrary perspective offered by the skepticism model views ex-
pression as containing multiple dimensions, all of which are pertinent 
to the first amendment, and none of which can be used to justify less-
ened constitutional protection. Viewed in this way, sexually explicit 
material is properly understood as representing (among other things) 
the human tendency to engage in socially deviant behavior, a tendency 
that is also expressed variously as renegade art and anti-establishment 
politics. There is no logically consistent way to attack pornography 
without also seeking to constrain other expressions of social deviance, 
because the anti-porn cause is rooted in a more pervasive concern with 
the deviance itself. 
A passage from the Pornography Commission Report is 
illuminating: 
[W]e find it difficult to understand how much of the material we have 
seen can be considered to be even remotely related to an exchange of 
views in the marketplace of ideas,. to an attempt to articulate a point of 
view, to an attempt to persuade, or to an attempt seriously to convey 
through literary or artistic means a different vision of humanity or of the 
world.264 
This passage implicitly refers to Frederick Schauer's notion that por-
nography is not "speech" for the purposes of the first amendment,265 
but it also hints at the Commissioners' more basic reaction to pornog-
raphy. The anti-porn crusaders dislike pornography because it speaks 
to the dark, antisocial, irrational side of the reader (or viewer). Porn 
has a purely visceral appeal. It proposes no ideas becau8e the intellect 
is not its province. It does not articulate a set of constructive social 
264. PORNOGRAPHY CoMMN. REP., supra note 102, at 265. 
265. See notes 113-48 supra and accompanying text. 
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values because it is inherently narcissistic and libidinous. It does not 
seek to persuade because those partaking of porn are already con-
vinced of its desirability. 
But it cannot be said that porn does not represent "a different vi-
sion of humanity or the world." The rejection of the very concept of 
social worth is a fundamental characteristic of the vision porn ex-
presses. Indeed, one measure of the pornographic content of an item 
is the extent to which it attacks the most sacred aspects of the majority 
ethic. Pornography seeks out society's rawest nerve, and then presses 
on it. The violation of social proscription is the basis for pornogra-
phy's appeal. Furthermore, the same pervasive negativity that infuses 
pornography also characterizes much of modem art, literature, and 
radical political expression. This is significant, because all of the judi-
cial opinions discussed above and all but one of the academic advo-
cates of censorship266 profess a desire to protect salacious expression if 
it can be shoehorned into one of these categories of social respectabil-
ity. Unfortunately, at the outer boundaries it is frequently difficult to 
distinguish between an artistic leer and a pornographic one. It does 
not diminish the value of art to suggest that many modem artists are 
driven by indecent impulses indistinguishable from those that motivate 
the purchasers and purveyors of pom.267 Indeed, the popular press 
266. The exception is Catharine MacK.innon. See notes 182-85 supra and accompanying 
text. 
267. Lustful obsession in art sometimes takes a very personalized form. For example, Oskar 
Kokoschka commissioned a dollmaker to make a life-sized doll of his estranged lover Alma 
Mahler. The doll later turned up in an oppressive painting called "Self-Portrait with Doll," in 
which "Kokoschka portrays himself also looking dumb and doll-like as he points ruefully in the 
direction of the reclining creature's belly and genitalia." Bass, A New View of Kokoschka, 
ARTNEws, Feb. 1987, at 111. Egon Schiele's favorite subject was himself, usually unclothed, 
and often captured in the act of making some masturbatory gesture. See S. WILSON, EGON 
SCHIELE 21-32 (1980). Tropic of Cancer contains a great deal of explicit material relating to the 
author's infatuation and exploits with French prostitutes. H. MILLER, TROPIC OP CANCER 
(1961). And then there is Brando and the butter dish. See Last Tango in Paris (United Artists 
1973). The more popular forms of artistic expression are equally obsessed with the forbidden 
"alternative sexual visions." For example, before he became a megastar the rock singer Prince 
was best known for his odes to incest. 
The fact is that artists are frequently inspired (whether consciously or subconsciously) as 
much by their lewd subject matter as by the loftier questions of form and composition. Arthur 
C. Danto, art critic for The Nation, recently described the artist Eric Fischl as "a relentless 
holder of an ethical mirror in which are reflected, as images, our weak and sleazy moral profiles." 
Danto, Eric Fischl, THE NATION, Mar. 31, 1986, at 769. Viewed literally, however, Fischl's 
paintings contain little more than distilled representations of bored but well-fed Americans strik-
ing vaguely-threatening sexual poses. Danto properly defends the presentation of sleaze as neces-
sary to communicate Fischl's artistic and political points. As Danto says, Fischl's conscious 
attitude is almost certainly one of moral approbation; his subjects' "puffy breasts and sagging 
bellies and empty looks" are undoubtedly "a metaphor for the decay of meaning in their lives." 
Id. at 771. Even so, does the moralist Fischl not linger a bit too long on the dissolute fleshiness of 
his scenes? Isn't it possible that Fischl finds the total degradation of the society he depicts just a 
tad enticing? Don't we all? How else can one explain the persistent attraction in artistic repre-
sentation of Caligula's Rome, Isherwood's Berlin, and fin-de-siecle Vienna? It is not easy for an 
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revels in the scabrous underpinnings of art. Would the recent contro-
versy over Andrew Wyeth's Helga paintings and drawings have been 
half as heated without the intimations of lust and adultery that lurked 
just beneath the surface?26s 
Much of twentieth-century art has been informed by the same 
acidic ethos on which pornography is founded. Yet most advocates of 
censorship would permit the continued distribution of artistic materi-
als that have lewd subjects because the real message of those pieces 
can be ignored. The certification of an object as Art greatly reduces 
the object's ability to communicate anti-social ideas. By branding 
something worthwhile, society can permit itself to relax. There is an-
aesthesia in aesthetics. Society operates on the assumption that Luis 
Bufiuel was not really a razor-happy sadist,269 Egon Schiele was not 
really obsessed with auto-eroticism, 270 and Henry Miller was not un-
naturally preoccupied with the sexual faculties of French prosti-
tutes. 271 Society's formalist aesthetic ideal asserts that each of these 
artists was concerned mainly with the creation of High Art, itself a 
noble social goal.272 The certification of sexually explicit expression as 
art thus permits the absorption and nullification of whatever hostile 
messages the art was intended to convey. The expression is denatured, 
and the threat originally posed by an antagonistic author is 
removed. 273 
artist such as Fischl to "say something disturbing about masturbation, molestation, loneliness, 
incest, bestiality, lust, sloth, intemperance, vanity, cupidity, selfishness and loss," id., at 772, 
without understanding, and perhaps experiencing, their appeal. 
268. Note, for example, the following excerpt from a review of Wyeth's "Helga Pictures" 
when they were shown at the National Gallery of Art. 
Just about every desire and feeling that the artist seems to have about woman is pro-
jected onto her. Helga appears as an embodiment of nature and a force of dark and mysteri-
ous sexuality. She is presented as page boy and Prussian, vulnerable as a sleeping child and 
hard and punitive as a military official. In the miked kneeling position in which Mr. Wyeth 
occasionally places her, and in the way some brush strokes lash and bind her, there are clear 
hints of sadomasochistic fantasies, but they are expressed without the humor or passion that 
offer the possibility of artistic resolution or growth. 
Brenson, Art: "The Helga Pictures" by Wyeth, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1987, § 1, pt. 2, at 49, col. 1. 
The objectification of women that Catharine MacKinnon views as the single most destructive 
aspect of pornography (which, indeed, she views as the defining characteristic of pornography, 
see MacKinnon, Civil Rights, supra note 154, at 18-20) is also a basic element of Wyeth's paint-
ings and drawings. "It is not that there is too much of Helga but rather that there is too little. 
Throughout this suite she exists almost totally as an object of the artist's desire." Brenson, supra. 
269. In Un Chien Andalou (L. Buiiuel & S. Dali, France 1928), a woman's eyeball is sliced in 
half with a razor. Buiiuel himself played the impassive man slicing the eyeball. See Mellon, An 
Overview of Bunuel's Career in THE WORLD OF LUIS BUNtJEL 17 (J. Mellon, ed. 1978). 
270. See note 267 supra. 
271. H. MILLER, supra note 267. 
272. For a critical analysis of the aesthetic perspective that seeks to deny art's dissenting 
force and use art to affirm existing social and political arrangements, see Marcuse, The Affirma-
tive Character of Culture, in NEGATIONS: EssAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY 88 (1968). 
273. This is demonstrated very clearly in John Finnis' discussion of aesthetic theory. See 
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The problem with pornography is that it can never be sanitized. 
Its hostile message cannot be diluted or ignored. Its single-mindedly 
antisocial character will remain regardless of society's efforts to ex-
plain it away. Porn exposes a rot in the framework of society, and the 
great popularity of porn makes the burghers uneasily suspicious that 
the surface rot may evidence a more deeply rooted degeneration of 
their moral and political primacy. Thus, the imperative to suppress 
pornography reveals a much deeper and more insidious insecurity 
than the moralists will ever acknowledge. 
This insecurity is reflected in the Supreme Court's recent tendency 
to use the predetermined worthlessness of sexually oriented speech to 
justify suppression of deviant expression generally. The case of Bethel 
School District v. Fraser illustrates this point.274 In Bethel a high 
school senior was suspended for three days as punishment for a speech 
he gave in support of a student candidate for school office. A majority 
of the Court upheld this punishment and rejected the student's first 
amendment claim. 275 
Finnis, supra note 100, at 231-37. The reader will recall that Finnis contends that the first 
amendment protects only reasoned discourse, and does not apply at all to communication in the 
"realm of passion, desires, cravings, and titillation." Id. at 227. See notes 100-13 supra and 
accompanying text. Finnis recognizes that his theory threatens the constitutional protection of 
art, because "art in all its forms neither derives from, nor appeals to, pure reason alone or even 
primarily." Finnis, supra note 100, at 231. Finnis solves this dilemma by looking beyond the art 
itself to the idea that art embodies. "What makes art art is not that it stimulates feelings, which 
any family picture album can do, but that it expresses them symbolica1ly. To be more precise, art 
expresses ideas of feeling •••. " Id. at 232-33 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). 
The artist, then, is analogized to a journalist or historian, objectively communicating factual 
ideas and concepts in the medium of art. "[T]he creative artist is not so much venting his own 
emotions, as imagining and conceiving emotions and feelings in such fashion that his understand-
ing of them can be communicated through the symbolic form of his chosen art." Id. at 233. This 
conception of the artist thus requires that art be viewed from a respectful distance in order to 
appreciate properly the information it communicates. "Only when we hold the work of art at 
arm's length is it artistic at all. The work brings emotions to mind or presents them for contem-
plation. When they are actually felt, we have overstepped the bounds of art." Id. at 234 n.78, 
quoting Kaplan, Obscenity as an Aesthetic Category, 20 LA w & CoNTEMP. PRODS. 544, 548 
(1955). 
This theory expresses the ultimate denigration of art: it transforms art into a decorative 
distraction for the educated classes. Furthermore, the theory patronizes and insults the artist. 
Artists may only present safe ideas for the viewer's detached contemplation. The artist may not 
incite or anger, for when emotions are felt "we have overstepped the bounds of art." Id. This 
aesthetic theory does, however, say a great deal about the psychology of censorship. Proponents 
of censorship, such as Finnis, view art as dangerous when its latent implications are uncon· 
strained. There is much in art that attacks, corrodes, and ultimately undermines altogether the 
legitimacy of the status quo. Goya's dark paintings, Leon Golub's depiction of officially en· 
dorsed torture, and Brecht's didactic theater are all intended both to outrage and to motivate 
conduct. These artists did not intend their work to be rationally contemplated from a comforta· 
ble distance, nor did they intend their work to be ineffectual. The pornographer, says Finnis, 
"calculat[es] to avoid all the 'special precautions' with which art must handle certain topics." Id. 
at 235. If the engage art produced in the modem era is any indication, so does the artist. 
274. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986). 
275. It is worth reprinting the speech that got Fraser into trouble: 
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The majority's view of Fraser's speech implies that the case repre-
sents a proper limitation on the demented rantings of a corrupt youth. 
The Court paints the picture of a wild-eyed unnaturally randy eight-
een-year-old standing before an unsuspecting audience, clutching his 
crotch, and moaning. But by emphasizing the implicitly "obscene," 
"vulgar," "sexually explicit," and "offensively lewd" nature of Fra-
ser's speech, 276 the Court obscured the real point the student intended 
to convey. The context of Fraser's speech makes it clear that he had 
no intention of arousing his audience sexually. The double entendre 
was aimed as much at the authority figures in the auditorium as it was 
at the students in the audience. The speech was a gentle swipe at the 
high school's ruling class, and it obviously hit its mark. Yet because 
the speech contained sexual innuendo, the Supreme Court confidently 
approved the suppression of its content and the punishment of the 
speaker. 
The Bethel case is a logical outgrowth of the idea that expression 
concerning sex is by its nature entitled to less rigorous protection 
under the first amendment than other subjects of discourse. This view, 
which must form the premise of all proposals to suppress pornogra-
phy, fundamentally misconstrues the manner in which sexual speech is 
used in our society. As Fraser's speech demonstrates, sexually ori-
ented expression is often used as a vehicle for a broader range of anti-
authoritarian notions. 277 And anti-authoritarianism is a category of 
expression that should head the list of subject matter entitled to pro-
tection by the first amendment. The ability to tweak the nose of the 
"I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is 
firm - but most .•• of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. 
"Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing 
and pushing until finally - he succeeds. 
"Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and every one of 
you. 
"So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - he'll never come between you and the best 
our high school can be." 106 S. Ct. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
276. See 106 S. Ct. at 3163, 3165-66. 
277. The Court has in one instance responded to this point by asserting that the form of a 
message can be divorced from the content of that message. See, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 
U.S. 726 (1978) (permitting the FCC to restrict public broadcast of the infamous "seven dirty 
words"). The Court held that the government regulation upheld in Pacifica "will have its pri-
mary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if 
any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." 438 U.S. at 743 
n.18. In other words, the Constitution protects only the pure essence of expression - ie., its 
content - and not the particular words with which that essence is communicated. But if the 
form of communication is now a dispensable element of expression, the Court has rendered "To 
be or not to be?" the constitutional equivalent of "Shall I kill myself or what?" Robbing words 
of their power is one of the surest ways to rob expression of its content. 
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king and his minions without legal retribution should be the starting 
point of any democratic theory. 
The flaunting of nontraditional sexuality is one of the most icono-
clastic gestures one can make in this country.278 More often than not, 
deviant sexual expression is merely the focal point for a more compre-
hensive rejection of bourgeois morality writ large. It is a means of 
expressing that rejection in terms that are often calculated to offend 
the comfortable, the self-satisfied, and the squeamish. It exhibits a 
willingness to go beyond the parameters set by polite society. It inten-
tionally spits in the face of those representing the status quo. Most 
importantly, having rejected the received notions of proper behavior 
dictated by society regarding sexual matters, the sexual deviant is per-
haps also less likely to march in lock step in response to other, tradi-
tionally political mandates as well. Iconoclasm has a political value 
independent of the particular context. 279 The Marquis de Sade is only 
the most colorful embodiment of the principle that sexually, aestheti-
cally, and politically deviant expression often issue from the same 
source. 
If censorship of pornographic materials increases, judges will inevi-
tably come to serve not only as art critics, separating the Schieles from 
the schlock, but as political censors as well, protecting the commu-
nity's staid and politically conservative values from unwanted interfer-
ence by the outlandish and the unworthy. The notion that some 
expression is not worth protecting is a dangerous one, and the impulse 
to censor is not easily contained. For example, I doubt that the aver-
age citizen (nor, for that matter, the average judge) intuitively finds 
much more enduring social value in the Spartacist League's Workers 
Vanguard than in Debbie Does Dallas. The morality principle is unac-
278. Indeed, this is probably true of every country. As Friedrich Engels once observed, "[i]t 
is a curious fact that with every great revolutionary movement the question of 'free love' comes 
into the foreground." F. Engels, The Book of Revelation, in 2 PROGRESS (1883), quoted in C. 
HILL, THE WORLD TuRNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS DURING THE ENGLISH 
REVOLUTION 247 (1972). For example, the historian Christopher Hill has noted that the princi-
ples of radical groups spawned during the English Revolution, such as the Ranters, included 
various theories of sexual liberation. See C. HILL, supra, at 306-23. These ideas complemented 
other tenets of the radical cause, such as the radicals' attack upon ecclesiastical authority and 
support for the emancipation of women. Id. 
279. See, e.g., Jerrold Seigel's analysis of the connections between Parisian Bohemians and 
the Paris Commune of 1871. J. SEIGEL, BOHEMIAN PARIS: CULTURE, PoLmcs, AND THE 
BOUNDARIES OF BOURGEOIS LIFE, 1830-1930, 181-212 (1986). The social iconoclasts of the 
period were drawn to the political radicalism of the Commune because of their hostility to estab-
lished institutions, ordinary society, and the very idea of placid normality. Although generally 
drawn from the ranks of the bourgeoisie, the Bohemians also experienced "a contrary conscious-
ness of exclusion and hostility that could not be firmly attached to any other class identity." Id. 
at 212. These recalcitrant Bohemian attitudes have obvious political connotations, but they have 
little in common with the rational and moderate political discourse that is often presented as the 
first amendment ideal. See, e.g., notes 85-148 supra and accompanying text. 
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ceptable because it confirms this intuition, and provides a reasoned 
analysis by which censorship can be justified. Pornography may be 
the immediate target of this analysis, but deviant expression of every 
sort will be the ultimate casualty. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial regulation of obscenity has developed historically in con-
junction with the judicial enforcement of morality. The morality prin-
ciple encapsulates the justification for this activity. The principle 
asserts, as Judge Bork recently put it, that the legal enforcement of 
majoritarian morality is "the very predicate of democratic govern-
ment."280 The Supreme Court has never expressed support for the 
morality principle quite as openly as Judge Bork, and has therefore left 
a legacy of piecemeal obscenity rulings that lack any clear theoretical 
foundation. The academic proponents of censoring pornography have 
attempted to rectify this unsatisfactory situation by offering a series of 
highly amorphous and deeply flawed theoretical justifications for sup-
pression. These academic proposals also skirt the real issue of enforc-
ing morality, but they introduce morality through the back door, 
smuggled in under the guise of philosophical or sociological absolutes. 
The most recent of these theories (Catharine MacKinnon's) is politi-
cally ironic as well. It would establish a system of regulation that 
could logically lead (in the service of the present power structure) to 
the censorship of MacKinnon's own work and the work of those who 
follow her lead. The incorporation of the morality principle into the 
first amendment necessarily entails that the state's franchise to censor 
pornographic expression is coextensive with its authority to censor 
other forms of speech that deviate from established norms. 
The disparate apologists of suppression considered in this article 
are united by a few common intellectual characteristics: belief in the 
discernibility of good, a corresponding belief in the discernibility of 
evil, and a deep-seated fear of what might occur to their respective 
moral (or philosophical or sociological) absolutes if contrary expres-
sion were not regulated. Theirs is to a large degree a religious mind-
set, a mind-set bent on protecting established verities, cultivating influ-
ence, and eliminating heresy. The disposition they share reveres cer-
tainty and cannot accommodate the skepticism that distinguishes 
modernism in all its forms. In the end, however, the proponents of 
censorship will never achieve a world to their liking. The expression 
they seek to suppress is merely a reflection of an uncomely world. 
280. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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Collective determinations that the world should be otherwise will not 
make it so. Louis Henkin distilled the essence of the present debate 
nearly a quarter-century ago, and in so doing identified the primary 
reason why the efforts to censor pornography will never solve the real 
problem. "Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime," Henkin observed. 
"Obscenity is sin."281 
281. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L. RBv. 391, 
395 (1963). 
